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BEFORE, AT, AND AFTER GETTYSBURG.

1. *Life on the Susquehanna in June-July, 1863,
with Notes.*
2. *The Financier's Evolving of the Lark by Gustave
Lindberg, in 1863, from the Narrative of
an Eye Witness, an English Journal in the
Swedish Service.*
3. *Reading, Illustrated.*
4. *Hooker's Effect on Gettysburg.*
5. *Sickles at Gettysburg.*
6. *Howd (Rebel) on Gettysburg.*
7. *After Gettysburg and at Williamsport and
Falling Waters in July, 1863.*
8. *Remarks on the Beneficial Union of the Theo-
retical and Penitential.*

BY

★ J. WATTS DE PEYSTER. ★

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1867.



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A Lovely, Elegantly Handled, and Thoroughly Fought Out Battle—
Pleasant to have been in—Pertinent to the
Consideration of Gettysburg.

[About the same time there were some beautiful fights in the other (north) extremity of the grand front of operations between Wittgenstein (Russian) and Oudinot, at Kliastitsy, on the Nitcha, 31st July, 1812 (similar to Humphreys at High Bridge on the Appomattox, 7th April, 1865) : at Dernowiczi, 31st July—1st August (here Verdier endeavoured but failed to imitate Wayne's successful audacity at Green Springs, 1781); also at Polotzk between St. Cyr (Oudinot being wounded) who on this occasion won the marshal's staff and Wittgenstein).—Sir Robert Wilson's "Invasion of Russia," 1812, pp. 74-76 and 123-128. St. Cyr's manœuvres previous to battle were precisely those of Torstenson before Janikau, 1645, and Hooker's manipulation of the Third Corps before Chancellorsville, and a Russian detachment cut its way out through the French masses just as the Italian general, Roccaivina, made good his escape from Castellaro, 23d November, 1795.]

Schwarzenberg, [July, 1812,] who was to have advanced on Minsk by Napoleon's orders, finding that Tormansow had collected his forces in such strength, suspended his movement; and although Napoleon approved of this suspension under the stated circumstances, still, unwilling to credit what he disliked, he ever had great doubts of the accuracy of the information, and ~~was his belief in one or his~~ great doubts thier, in which he observed "that Tormansow nevertheless would be found to have more than 8000 or 9000 bad troops."

On the 25th July, a brigade of Regnier's corps, commanded by Klingil, at Kobrin, where it was surrounded by Tormansow, and after a brave resistance of hours, in which it lost 2000 men killed and wounded, was obliged to surrender; men laid down their arms, with 4 stand of colors and 8 pieces of cannon.

[The localities of these engagements lie from 160 to 175 miles eastwards of Warsaw, about 200 south-east of Königsberg, and 175 south by west of Wilna.]

Regnier endeavored, by a forced march, to support Klingil; but finding, while in the neighborhood, that he had arrived too late, he fell back on Slonin, where he united with Schwarzenberg.

Tormansow marched with a portion of his force on Prujany, and detached some light troops [Stuart's Rebel cavalry] in rear of the Austrians towards Bialystock and Warsaw, where the consternation was so great, and whence the panic so widely spread, that Loison, who commanded at Königsberg, marched thence on Rastenberg with 10,000 men to reinforce Schwarzenberg and Regnier.

Tormansow, embarrassed for provisions and jealous of his magazines in Wolyhnia, on finding that Schwarzenberg and Regnier were advancing upon him, retired and took post at Gorodeczna, half way between Kobrin and Prujany. Schwarzenberg and Regnier pressed forwards, eager to avenge the affront at Kobrin; but all the enterprises against the detached Russian corps were baffled by the vigilance and judicious dispositions of their commanders.

Unfortunately, Tormansow, not having been joined by his reserve, consisting of 13,000 men, could only place 18,000 in position, whilst the confederate force was composed of 13,000 Saxons and 25,000 Austrians. But the position was a strong one. A marsh lay in front and swept around it, affording security to the rear of the right, and skirting the left for about three miles to the source of the rivulet by which the marsh was formed, and where a thick wood, nearly as long and a mile and a half deep, continued to bend around within two miles of the Kobrin road, the only line of retreat for the Russians and which lay through Tewele.

The position may therefore be described as a great half-moon battery [similar to Union position at Gettysburg and Rebel position at Cumberland Church, 7th April, 1865], with the marsh as its glacis and partial wet-ditch. Over the marsh ran three dykes: the first formed the great road from Prujany to Kobrin; the second, the route of Poddobno, was not practicable for artillery; the third made a route from Chierikow to Kobrin and Brest Litowski.

[Concluded on 3d page of Cover.]

LEE ON THE SUSQUEHANNA IN 1863.

A MILITARY CRITICISM.

BY

★ J. WATTS DE PEYSTER. ★

"The * * * is aware that in this present age of indifference he must submit to the * * * As regards the charge of reviving 'the evil' which history has * * * remember that the wisdom of the Present is based upon the experience of * * * far from being our duty, in charity, to cast a veil * * * it is a charity to * * * unmask their enemy, and to warn the present generation of the onslaught * * *"—REV. WILLIAM BRAMLEY MOORE, in Preface to his historical romance, "The Valleys," VIII. and XVI.

built up of two distinct parts. One of these, *the public or notorious part*, * * * includes the * * * of events. The official and confidential communications remain on the * * * the day comes when they are picked out of the dust."—NAPIER-KLINKOW-ETERNICH. Vol. I., page 172.

for the completion of a carefully digested work, fully * * * by Maj.-Gen. Humphreys, Chief of Staff Army of the * * * ac, and Commandant of the combined Second and Third * * * s, originally published in the New York *Citizen and Round * * * 2*, "La Royale"—which completed a series of pamphlets on "Slaveholders' Rebellion," relating to the closing scenes of * * * e of the most momentous conflicts in which humanity ever * * * gaged—a conflict in which armies were extemporized whose * * * piers in the *moral* discipline, which alone makes nations in- * * * incible, have never existed on this planet—a few additional * * * words may be added in regard to the inexpressible value of time; in * * * deprecation of half measures; in an exposition of the want of * * * common sense which demonstrated a lack of true genius in the * * * chief Rebel commander. In the course of this conflict the writer * * * published a pamphlet on "Winter Campaigns, the Test of * * * Generalship," which was, curiously enough, followed by a sudden * * * change in the operations of our armies. In 1863, another pam- * * * phlet on "Practical Strategy" appeared, which attracted so much * * * attention that General (British Army) Hon. Sir Edward Cust, D. * * * C. L., author of the "Annals of the Wars," 9 vols., and "Lives of * * * the Warriors," 6 vols., prefaced his last issue, in 1869, with a * * * Letter-Dedicatory (of xxxvii. pages), to the writer of this Re- * * * view, in which he admits the full force of the "Practical * * * [Strategie Pratique] which, while it acknowledges every * * * conscious that exceptions prove the rule, and "may * * * first germs of a new rule," and while it restrains mere * * * in the limits of the rule, proper, permits Genius to * * * self which arrests Talent; because Genius is creative

Talent merely applicative. General Cust, in his "Letter Dedicatory" to the writer, remarks on pages XIX., XX.: "Now, in the PRACTICE of war, as we learn it from history, there have been a great many sound strategical contingencies, which permitted and even obliged the commanding general to depart altogether from any base of operations. In honest truth, I believe that our own Wellington is the only great general who, under every phase of his career, adhered consistently to the maintenance of a base; but then, for the greater part of his career, *his base was his ship*." (1.) [His base was the whole coast of Spain which was in his view exactly corresponds with the idea of Washington for the time being was the district he occupied, because The famous Torstenson marched an army from Me Baltic, altogether in the face of the enemy the entire consisted his army effectively in that long and arduous move out any base. Marlborough marched from the Netherlands Danube without a base; and Marshal von Traun, in like carried his army from the Rhine to the Elbe, and crossed rivers in the teeth of the enemy, and yet had neither magazines hospitals for his soldiers. Take the example of Napoleon, masterly campaign of 1814, when it was quite impossible for to pay any regard whatever to any base of operations. facts of undisputed history will prove to the reviewer that in PRACTICE OF WAR a base is not absolutely necessary, although must be admitted to be so in theory. Besides, it will be found the history of many campaigns, that it has been often found necessary in effect to change a base in the midst of operations. Some established line of retreat must always, of course, be indispensable, since every well-ordered army must have its communications with magazines and hospitals; yet, if war is ever to feed itself according to the French Republican school, a base is scarcely practicable, except when it is a whole district."

Washington, for example, with the small armies he commanded, made each position which he successively occupied serve as a base for his comparatively insignificant forces, since he could derive all the "supplies for the mouth" from the country immediately surrounding him. The difficulty of making the term BASE comprehensible generally is that almost every one confounds base with contour of base which in some respects are the same and, nevertheless, are entirely different.

This paragraph is the text on which the writer found a criticism on the operations of Lee in one especially in the summer of 1863. This criticism was written ago and immediately after visiting the country between Philadelphia and Gettysburg, the battlefield itself, and the d

the latter and the Potomac in its course from Williamsport past the arena of Antietam or Sharpsburg. They were not published at that time, because the people were so wild in their judgment of men and events, especially in regard to military operations, that a calm consideration of any campaign was impossible while prejudice was in the ascendancy, and the touchstone of political success deemed the only criterion whereby to judge of a science and an art which, however much politics had and has to do with it, yet, if it hopes to perfect itself, should have as little as possible to do with politics. That these are not, however, opinions formed "after the fact" (*apres coup*) is susceptible of the best proof. They were first submitted to one of our ablest corps commanders, who perfectly coincided therewith, and laid before a military friend who was in Pennsylvania at the time and knew the temper and dispositions of the people and of things. More recently another major-general, U. S. A., who has drawn up the most admirable plans, day by day, of Lee's Gettysburg campaign, has enunciated the same doctrine. Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warren, and others of high rank, coincided in every particular with the writer. Previously, and at the time when these considerations would have particularly interested the public, they were withheld, because they were utterly opposed to the views of men who at the time, in this country, were considered infallible judges in all military matters, just exactly what they, in reality, were not, as events and they themselves proved.

A theoretic general and a theoretic critic, such as the author of the "History of the Army of the Potomac," styled by another theoretical teacher "the Napier of our War," must ever place a *false* estimate upon the *absolute* necessity of maintaining uninterrupted communications with a fixed base, just as a tethered animal can not exceed the length of the cord or lariat by which it is attached to the picket or "base." Genius will tear up the picket and "go it loose"—not a slang expression, but a regular military phrase in the "Iron Age," the XVIIth, a century of continuity and the bloodiest war—when the opportunity presents itself. On such occasions to be trammelled by any iron-clad rule indicates a destitution of that common sense which, in its immediate application to the fitting occasion, is simply another expression of genius, and this (Genius) is a direct interposition of God through an individual human brain to the opportunity.

One of the best exemplifications of the want of common sense is the course of General Robert E. Lee in Pennsylvania, in June-July 1863, firstly in that he seemed to be totally blind to the immense results which must have resulted in an audacious "Forward" in his last "sortie;" and, secondly, in that he forgot

that the object of a sortie is to do as much damage as possible to the investing forces, but particularly to their material, their supplies and their works. He forgot that many great generals, who dared to cut loose from their communications and, like Torstenson, "make war support war," have thereby achieved the greatest triumphs, on record, for their country. Why? Because in so doing he continually created new bases. Sherman's March to the Sea was simply a change of base of a railroad to the base of marine transportation. One of the severest charges brought against Gustavus Adolphus was that he did not march direct on Vienna after his victory of Leipsic, 7th September, 1631, and dictate peace in the enemy's capital, (2) just as Frederic began with violating the laws of theoretic-martinet-strategy with his operations in Silesia in 1741. Frederic may be said to have been always "cut loose," vibrating, shooting to and fro like a shuttle. Napoleon compelled a peace on his own terms in 1797 and 1805; in both cases by paying no attention to what was happening in his rear, but looking steadfastly to Vienna and to the main army of the enemy immediately opposed to him, as his objectives. His campaigns of Jena to some extent, and of Eylau, were in reality made in violation of the military rule of "securing his communications," in the ordinary sense of this misunderstood term. Thus Blucher operated in the fall of 1813, in 1814 and in 1815, and saw triumph crown his audacity. Although Blucher cut loose from his base on the Rhine after Ligny, yet, nevertheless, he simply changed his base, because the British army then constituted a new base to him.

Hannibal, and all who did greatly like him, succeeded through their own consummate common sense, or audacious genius, since it is admitted "the Carthaginians did not beat the Romans, but Hannibal the Roman generals." He got no victory but by his own individual conduct." (*Scarce Tract*, No. 10, Series pro and con a Standing Army, 1697. Page 9.) How often have great generals cut loose from their communications and achieved wonders commensurate with the risk. One of the severest charges—repeated for emphasis—against Gustavus-Adolphus was that he did not march directly upon Vienna after Leipsic, 1632, and dictate peace in the enemy's capital. Oxenstiern, one of the wisest heads that ever lived, urged this very course. (3.) Chancellorsville, in Lee's case, corresponded to Leipsic. From Leipsic to Vienna, as the crow flies, is three hundred miles; from Chancellorsville to Philadelphia, by the same route Lee followed, is about the same distance. In 1632 roads were only such in name: in 1863, these were not only macadamized, but there were parallel railroads. Between Leipsic and Vienna rise fearful mountains and rivers, as a rule not fordable and subject to sudden floods.

It is more than likely that had Napoleon, in 1813, carried out his own plan, which he projected at Duben, which was traversed by his marshals, and operated "Forward on Berlin!" with his left, the campaign would have terminated just the contrary of what it did immediately afterwards at Leipsic. Oxenstiern, one of the wisest heads that ever planned and counseled (who, in after years, 1641-45, found a perfect executive in Torstenson), urged his master Gustavus to move onwards to the Danube after *his* Leipsic, in September, 1631, as did Horn after *his* subsequent astonishing passage of the Lech in 1632. Thalheimer places this in the clearest light. Recent researches have demonstrated in a great measure, that politics, not strategy, influenced the Swedish monarch *not* to march southwards, and the lure of ambitious aggrandizement blinded him to the prize of military success. The very political reasons which arrested or diverted Gustavus should have urged Lee onwards, for the recognition of the Confederacy lay in the direction of Philadelphia, which was *open*, and *not* on the route to Washington, which was *barred* by the army of the Potomac. (See note LECH, BRIDGING, &c.)

Chancellorsville, in Lee's case, corresponded to Leipsic. From Leipsic to Vienna, as the crow flies, is some three hundred miles. From Chancellorsville to Philadelphia, by the route Lee followed, is almost the same distance.

Throughout the campaign of Chancellorsville-Gettysburg—for the two battles and concurrent operations in reality constituted but one campaign—and the writer will even maintain that Gettysburg was the fruit of the flower Chancellorsville—Lee was constantly demonstrating the inferiority of his generalship. If ever a commander was outgeneraled, Lee was by Hooker in the initiative operations around Fredericksburg. Little credit is due to Lee for what was done in the Wilderness to retrieve the first baulk. (Exactly force of Napoleon's Table Talk, pages 19 and 21.)

That Lee was not utterly defeated there, is not due to his own capacity, but to the incapacity of those who could have delivered mortal blows more than once and did not. (4.) After this, when preparing his "last sortie," Pleasonton developed his whole plan of operations, and had Hooker enjoyed the full powers to which he was entitled, he could scarcely have failed to have crushed Lee.

When the first reliable news of Lee's invasion of the North, in June-July, 1863, reached Tivoli, I pronounced the movement "the last desperate throw of a gambler, who recklessly stakes all his remaining fortune on a single cast of the dice." Satisfied of what must be the inevitable result, if the Government displayed common-place energy, and profited by the examples furnished by the conduct of great generals in parallel situations—lessons with which

military history abounds—the letter, following, was written and addressed to the President. As was afterwards discovered, the view taken of the case therein coincided, almost word for word, with the counsels of the wronged but prescient Hooker. This letter was held back by a person, Jas. H. Woods, Esq., deceased, to whom it was entrusted to forward, and, when too late to have any effect, was returned. Subsequently the editor of a leading journal, friendly to Gen. Hooker, desired to publish it. Such was the disgust—if the expression is permissible—however, consequent upon the escape of Lee, that it seemed useless either to propose anything like a common-sense plan of operations, or hope for better things as long as any trusted *one*, or whoever directed or controlled military movements, was retained as supreme military director at Washington, or exercised influence or authority there over the generals in the field; since it seemed to be understood that the general interests of the country, especially in June–July, 1863, had been sacrificed in a great measure to prejudices or personal dislikes, want of comprehensive views and consequent errors in judgment. The result proved the correctness of Hooker's judgment, and this letter is printed to prove that he was not alone in his convictions of what measures were necessary to insure success. A few thousand veteran troops (A), in addition to those on hand in Maryland and at Washington, thrown upon Lee's communications, would have terminated the career of that Army of Northern Virginia which escaped from Gettysburg to protract the war for twenty months and cost the country hundreds of millions of dollars and the lives of more soldiers than had been squandered in the two preceding years at the East. That the Rebels feared this very movement is abundantly proved by the following extracts from the journal of a Union general, taken prisoner, 2d July, at Gettysburg. "At Martinsburg, which was crowded with Rebel wounded, it was authoritatively reported that a brigade of our cavalry was not far distant, and its coming was momentarily expected. Fears were entertained that the two brigades of Pickett's division, which had been stationed on the Peninsula, and were hastening to join Lee, would be cut off." "Both in Martinsburg and Winchester, Loyalists were jubilant and Rebels dispirited at the prospect. The latter anticipated the failure of Lee's army to recross the Potomac and *admitted, even if it did, it would only be to fall into the hands of troops they expected we would cross over on our ponton bridges below Williamsport for the purpose.*"

"TIVOLI, June 30th, 1863.

"His Excellency, President LINCOLN.

"SIR:—You hesitate to abandon unimportant posts in order to concentrate their garrisons around Lee, the papers say because

it would not look well abroad to give up any ground we have won. Was such the Practical Strategy of Bonaparte in his most glorious campaign in Italy in 1796? When it was necessary to oppose Wurmser he abandoned the siege of Mantua, left his one hundred and forty siege guns in his works, marched to meet and beat the Austrians, and, then, when the armies of succor were disposed of, returned before Mantua and settled its fate. No great general, no sensible man, no man of average judgment, hesitates to sacrifice a lesser good to secure a greater. Great generals look to ends and weigh means only in their relation to the attainment of great ends.

"If chronic lethargy, or rather apparent chronic lethargy of conception can be shaken off, Lee is between the upper and nether mill-stone, provided the concentration of troops affords sufficient power to the machinery to grind him to atoms there.

"Your Excellency may consider this letter as of even less importance than the offer I once made you of good troops, and subsequently of a good officer, W——. P. W——; but history and eternity will hold you responsible for the partial or entire ruin of the North, when we offered you our blood, and our children, and our means, without (I am speaking of the people, not politicians) stint or selfish thoughts of ourselves.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[Signed]

"J. WATTS DE PEYSTER."

[From pamphlet "The Decisive Conflicts of the Late Civil War, or Slaveholders' Rebellion: Battles Morally, Territorially and Militarily Decisive." New York, 1867.]

Escaping through a series of chances, the occurrence and success of which no human being could have taken into consideration, Lee had an opportunity of immortalizing himself. Had he profited by his gain of time, he could have struck a blow at the North—he could have plunged his steel so deep into its vitals—that, even if it eventually did recuperate, the shock would have given a long lease of life, if not foreign recognition and independence to the Confederacy. Had he crossed the Susquehanna, Philadelphia could not have been preserved from the visitation of his army, and New York might have seen the "Stars and Bars" upon the heights of Weehawken and felt its shells and other missiles, even if a superior navy had prevented the triumphal entry of the invader. Pennsylvania was full of food—food of every kind for an army—and Lee should have recollected the promotion of a Russian sergeant by Suworow, "the greatest soldier Russia has ever produced or, perhaps, ever will produce" (Marston, 274), for a saying erroneously assigned, like so many other good things, to

Napoleon. Suworow having propounded the question, "how an army threatened with starvation should supply itself with provisions," and getting no satisfactory reply from his generals or staff, was delighted with a response from the ranks, "*From the enemy!*" Lee could have acquired everything that his army needed, that the revolted States required, from the enemy, and if Meade did not (to use Doubleday's expression) let Lee "severely alone," Meade would not have greatly embarrassed Lee; not from want of will, not from lack, perhaps, of inherent skill; but from a defective moral organization which, in crises, seemed to paralyze great gifts and neutralize his application of the superior forces under his control.

July 27th Lee's main army was at Chambersburg. Examine Swinton's "Twelve Decisive Battles," 318, and see what the "Napier of the Rebellion" (*sic*) has to say on the subject.

Simultaneously with the appearance of the Rebels in the vicinity of, or before, the Capital of Pennsylvania, June 26-28, Hooker crossed the Army of the Potomac into Maryland. To all intents and purposes, if Lee had intended to push ahead, he had at least three days the start of Hooker. On the same day, 27th June, Ewell was already operating at Carlisle and York, the divisions of his corps scattered over a front of forty miles, so that they could have forded the Susquehanna at several points at once, scattering the provisional defensive levies like chaff. Supposing that Lee had ninety to one hundred thousand men, which he had before he turned back to Gettysburg, he could have sent one column of twenty-five thousand (one of our ablest strategists says five thousand would have been sufficient) due north-east into the coal regions, where tens of thousands were expecting him, and would have welcomed him with a destruction of property almost beyond calculation. The inroad would have put an end to getting out the coal needed by our navy and manufactories, especially for articles for the use of both army and navy. The main body could have kept on to Philadelphia, while to the right a flying column could have made a circuit through Elkton, Wilmington and Chester. This may seem chimerical, but people are too apt to forget how near Early came to capturing Washington in 1864, with a column variously estimated at from ten to twenty-five thousand men, after defeating an army equal in numbers, but composed of troops inferior to the Rebel veterans, on the Monocacy. (5.) All that saved the National Capital was the arrival of the old Sixth Corps, brought round by water from the lines before Petersburg.

As to any resistance that could be offered to the veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia by troops newly mustered into the service, volunteers or militia, the idea is simply preposterous.

The whole of Pennsylvania was alive with militia, both in 1862 and 1863, and it is very doubtful if the Rebel generals took them into account. Policy keeps a great many regular and competent officers silent as to the utter inefficiency of any but a few thoroughly organized regiments, such as came from New York, and it is very doubtful if even these could have stood up for an instant against good tried troops, acclimated to battle in the open field.

Ewell was already operating at York and Carlisle, the divisions of his corps scattered over a line of forty miles between these places—a line perpendicular to Lee's line of advance, and within this angle, more or less concentrated on interior lines, stood the Union forces. Now had Lee been actually dependent for great success on maintaining his line of communications intact, and if this consideration applied to his own direct or his perpendicular line, how much more applicable to the line which extended from this at a right angle down the Susquehanna. His sortie had been as much endangered throughout his whole advance to the Susquehanna, as it would have been beyond the Susquehanna; that is to say if, at first, Hooker had been permitted to carry out his plans, or if at last Meade had acted with promptness and vigor. Lee had about ninety to one hundred thousand men of all arms. His extreme advanced troops, as had been stated, were before Harrisburg. The defences of that city, the capital of Pennsylvania, in reality amounted to nothing. As regarded such an army as Lee had, Fort Washington, which commanded the passage of the Susquehanna, even if it had been tenaciously held, was no obstacle, since it could be easily turned to the right or south. The writer examined into this when at Harrisburg, in May, 1867, with Maj.-Gen. S. W. Crawford. That this was so, no military mind could question. The passage of the river was not dependent on the bridges, since, if these had been destroyed, there is a ford at Harrisburg, easy and safe at low water, which was the case in June, 1863. The Duke de Rochefoucauld-Liancourt testifies it was so, when he visited this country shortly after the Revolution of 1776-83. No one can dispute this, because market wagons used to avail themselves of it to avoid the payment of tolls, and even sheep, the most timid and helpless of animals to handle in the water, have been driven across. If the river could fall so low when the forests and marshes were as yet comparatively intact, what must it be (1863) when so much of the former have disappeared and the latter have been drained. Besides this ford in front of Harrisburg, there is another between fifteen and twenty miles below, farther down at Bainbridge, above Marietta, and a third below the dam below the Columbia Bridge, and the dam built to create slack water for the Susquehanna Water Canal.

[It is said there are other fords, one even as far down as near Havre-de-Grace.]

The last two fords designated, however, can only be used at very low water, but such was actually the case 20th June—1st July, 1863. These facts were collected from a variety of sources after careful investigation. Much information was derived from D. Wills, Esq., a gentleman of very great knowledge of local matters and of the highest standing, at Gettysburg. His statements were corroborated by Hon. D. McConaughy, Esq., formerly State Senator and Sheriff of Adams County—a county bounded on the east by the Susquehanna—who added that the lower ford (only) is difficult for wagons on account of submerged rocks. That troops, foot and horse, could get across was proved by the fact that some of the local organizations for defence, when their retreat was cut off by the premature burning of the Columbia Bridge, effected their escape by these very fords.

It is well known that the Susquehanna is fordable, in many places, with no enemy to oppose a passage through it and a sufficiency of materials and mechanical skill to repair the bridges, so that, at most, Lee's crossing could not have been delayed but a few hours; whereas it was far different with the Army of the Potomac, which would have encountered ready, organized, experienced opposition. In fact, Lee's having got over had every advantage, for if the Union forces had attempted to cross, the Rebels could have fallen upon them in detachments as they gained the Eastern shore. Again, it must be remembered that between Lee and his *objective*, Philadelphia (6), there were no organized forces; he had no resistance to expect in his front. Lee's position on the left bank placed at his disposal all the military and other resources of the country between the Susquehanna and the Delaware. The only course by which the Army of the Potomac could have hoped to anticipate Lee and save Philadelphia was the Wilmington Railroad route, and to avail itself of that there was not sufficient time. The Army of the Potomac could receive no considerable valid reinforcement from the country East of the Susquehanna; Philadelphia was an open place and utterly defenceless, and, once there, Lee could have concentrated all his troops to fight a battle near it; for he had no necessity to leave any garrison behind. When Lee selected Philadelphia as his *objective*, he must have considered his Army of Northern Virginia capable of whipping the Army of the Potomac on any field he might select, and that this was his conclusion—the complete superiority of his army to that of his opponent—constitutes the only excuse for his utter madness of fighting at Gettysburg. It may be therefore assumed as demonstrated that Lee could have taken possession of the whole country

between the Susquehanna and the Delaware; his inability to hold it depended on the answer to the question whether combatting on a fair field of battle, Lee's army could, to a certainty, beat the Army of the Potomac, which the Rebel generals assuredly considered that it could.

Putting the fords out of the question, however, there are several points where military bridges can be thrown across the Susquehanna with great facility, inasmuch as the river, although broad, is not deep and is obstructed by islands and bars, while the woods and buildings on either shore would afford more than sufficient material, ready at hand, for any number of bridges such as an army as that under Lee would have required. After the battle of Rosbach, Frederic bridged the Unstrut, says Muffling, in three or four hours, and Blucher repeated the operation after Leipsic under the foremanship of an aged carpenter, who actually had, many years previous, worked on the bridge of the great king. Gustavus crossed the Rhine on every kind of temporary buoyant materials, himself on a barn-door, and Traun, in 1644, established his bridges over the same river in the face of a large army and retreated across that river with equal success in the course of one moonlight night. Frederic, it is true, was following up a flying panic-stricken foe; but such was not the case with either Gustavus or with Traun. There was nothing before Lee which could have stopped a veteran army for a single hour. The majority of the *nominal* troops were at Harrisburg, and in the presence of veteran troops they would have counted as nothing. The temporary Pennsylvania levies were as though they were not, and the unnecessarily total destruction of the Columbia Bridge presents uncontrovertable proof of their condition of mind, and of the military capacity of their commanders.

Simultaneously with the movements of Early down the west bank of the Susquehanna, as far south as the Columbia Bridge and York, the shire town of Adams County, Jenkins' brigade of cavalry was demonstrating before Harrisburg, and this insignificant force was driving people wild with apprehension. The defenses of Harrisburg—as stated—amounted to nothing, and Fort Washington, which defended the passage of the Susquehanna (repeated to emphasize), could be easily turned to the right or south.

From Frederick City to Gettysburg is twenty-three miles; thence to Chambersburg twenty-four miles; to Harrisburg thirty-five miles by the most direct route. From Frederick City to Hagerstown is twenty-four miles; from Hagerstown to Chambersburg is twenty miles. In either case the Army of the Potomac was at least two days' hard marches behind the Army of Northern Virginia.

The latter always outmarched the former in the ratio of three to two, often two to one. In a country full of timber and wooden buildings, an army of Americans—natural mechanics, like the Finns of Gustavus, who were excellent substitutes for pontooners—could bridge the Susquehanna in twenty-four hours in a quiet or low stage of the water, as was the case at this time, June 26th–July 1st, 1863. Now, conceding that the Army of the Potomac would have had to lose or devote one day to the repair of bridges, &c., then, even if Lee left no rearguard to dispute the passage of the Susquehanna, it would still have been a full day's march behind the Rebel invading force. From Harrisburg or York to Philadelphia is one hundred miles, with railroads, direct, between these points and Philadelphia. There were no troops in his front that could have stopped Lee for an instant. The troops constituting the garrison of Harrisburg were not trustworthy against the veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia. Officers who had seen service spoke in most depreciating terms of them. Those who were in the place at the time said there was a scare on the people; that they were stampeded. The description given of them by eye-witnesses recalls Voltaire's remarks upon the Parisian troops in 1649. (Cust's Condé, 156.)

Phil. Kearny looked forward to such a master-stroke in 1862. Leland, in his "Abraham Lincoln," page 149, says that Lee ought to have gone to Philadelphia. General A. A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A., in his Obituary Address on Meade, 18th November, 1872, page 8, observes, "*the great object of his [Lee's] campaign. It was the capture of this city, Philadelphia.*" (7.) Lee could have lived off the country, could have levied a heavy contribution on Philadelphia and other cities or towns along the route, and could have made his way back with scarcely any possibility of being overtaken or intercepted by the Army of the Potomac or any other army the United States possessed or could assemble after the blundering which preceded Hooker's concentration at Frederick City and subsequently led to his resignation.

A stern chase, even at sea and in sight, is always a long chase. A pursuit by a vessel of equal speed with the fugitive could only base a remote hope of success on almost incalculable contingencies. In this case, on land, the pursued would have been swifter than the pursuer. The latter, the Army of the Potomac, could have only hoped to succeed in overtaking the Army of Northern Virginia in case that Lee was delayed or stopped, and there was nothing in existence, or that could be improvised, to delay or stop him.

It is difficult to conceive the extent of the obstacle to a large army with its materials presented by a broad, rapid and uncertain

river, if vigilantly watched or guarded, especially if this river is not too broad for the artillery of the day, and is yet too broad to enable an army (seeking to force a passage) to establish a cross fire sufficiently effective to cover a disembarkation and sweep away every obstacle to the throwing over, or construction of, a bridge. The Susquehanna is not so broad that field artillery can not play with deadly effect on a detachment of engineer troops attempting to throw or build any kind of a military bridge, and yet it is too broad for field artillery to clear out batteries posted to prevent a passage, provided these are skilfully placed, covered, or concealed and worked.

Any one who will study up the details of our Revolutionary War, will comprehend at once how it was that the Catawba, only five hundred yards wide at an ordinary stage of water, the Yadkin, and the Dan proved such impediments to Cornwallis in pursuing Greene—in fact saved Greene. Sudden rains so swelled these streams that Greene's escape was looked upon as being due to the special interposition of Providence. Cornwallis had, at this time, as fine an army for its size as there was in the world. His light infantry was unexceptionable. All his troops were in prime condition, stripped for pursuit and fight. Nevertheless, if Greene's troops had enjoyed any equality, notwithstanding their inferiority of numbers, they could have stopped Cornwallis at the Catawba, and again at the Yadkin, without any assistance from the rain.

How often have the Rappahannock and Rapid Anna above their junction, mere creeks in comparison to the Susquehanna, arrested the Army of the Potomac. Mine Run, a marshy trickle traversed one of the best planned movements of the war. The pursuit of Morgan after the Cowpens, and of Greene after 25th January by Cornwallis, in January and February, 1781, demonstrated the impediments presented by insignificant streams to the best of troops and in the best condition, even when following up forces in every way inferior—that is to say “by streams comparatively insignificant” when swollen by heavy and sudden rains. (Steadman, folio 325. Gordon, IV. 37-46.)

The overflow, 29th-30th January, 1781, of the Catawba, usually perfectly fordable, arrested the British two days. The Catawba, in the ordinary stage of water about 500 yards in width, although with a rapid current and bottom of loose stones, would not have stopped and did not stop the pursuers for an hour. The Yadkin might have served as an impassible barrier had it been properly defended by the weak American rear-guard—but even as Davidson was out-generated at McCowan's ford, even so the riflemen fled as soon as the main body of the British had passed over. And yet both the Catawba and Yadkin could have been easily defended

by a few steady troops well handled even against Cornwallis, who had a veteran light infantry second to none in the world. The Dan, over which Greene passed in one day, stopped Cornwallis entirely. (Steadman, folio 332. Gordon, IV., 45, 46. Cornwallis marched twenty to thirty miles in a day.)

Is it not perfectly just to assert that the Susquehanna, four times as wide and strong as the above mentioned Carolinian streams, presented an insuperable barrier to any number of troops, however good, when its fordable or smooth crossings—*i. e.*, free from rapids—were defended by five or ten thousand resolute veteran infantry, with plenty of artillery. In the same way as the Catawba and Yadkin against Cornwallis, likewise the Dan, and, although by the time Greene reached the latter river, the militia had nearly all deserted him, Cornwallis with 3000 of the finest troops in the world was unable to overtake the 2000 Americans, of whom a great number had not a rag of clothing except a piece of blanket. (Tomes, Div. V., Part 2, Chap. xcvi. and xcvi., &c.)

The most extraordinary case, however, of the utter disregard of a base and line of communication was when Frederic the Great in 1760 moved from Saxony into Silesia to relieve the latter province from the presence and pressure of the enemy. An Austrian army under Lascy, and another under Daun, followed close in his rear, so that the Prussians seemed as if they were escorted by the Imperialists. Yet, notwithstanding Frederic had a huge wagon train with him, such was the dread which he inspired that he did not lose a single carriage, and with all their vastly superior forces the enemy did not dare to attack him.

Any one who will take the trouble to compare the remarkable incidents which attended the escape of Morgan, 1780, and, again, of Greene, in 1781, and those of Coligny (Besant's "Gaspard de Coligny," 184-185), will be compelled to admit that, if certain men representing causes, and causes themselves, are not under the protection of God, there is no truth in anything. On the 29th August, 1568, Coligny, encumbered with women and children, with but a feeble military escort, had to fly to escape the persecuting pursuit of the troops under the young Duke of Guise. "In the morning they arrived at the river [Loire]. It was impossible to wait. The river must be forded. While they hesitated, a single voice was raised, 'When Israel came out of Egypt.' All joined in the psalm, and, so singing, the ford was crossed. Fortunately, the waters were low. Protestant historians loved afterwards to tell how a miracle was wrought, and how, when the enemy appeared on the banks, the water rose and flooded the ford, so that they, the enemy, could not get across. On the 20th of September, the fugitives rode into La Rochelle." Michelet (IX., 351-2) says that The "Refuge of Coligny,

Conde, and their families and friends, was at Noyers, in Burgundy. The Asylum was La Rochelle, four hundred and fifty miles distant. To fly from the Serin to the ocean, traverse rivers, escape pursuing troops and hostile cities, was to accomplish the improbable; nevertheless it succeeded as it were by a miracle. The Loire shrunk to allow their fording, swelled full again to stop those who pursued, so that the pursuers were captured in the toils they set for the Huguenots. [The Linth is an insignificant stream, and yet, on the 26th September, 1799, if the Austrian General Hotze had not been surprised and killed by the sudden chance fire of a platoon, the French could not have made good their footing on the other bank. The death of Hotze (a very able general) led to the utter defeat of his corps or army division, as it may be styled, and determined the fate of the campaign.] [Examine Dunlap's "New York." (Schuyler stopped by breaking of ice on Hudson, which had previously served as bridge for flying French, February, 1793.) I., 221, Edition of 1840, II.; Red Man's Thermopylæ, a log over an unfordable stream, 159, &c.

The Rhine is nothing like as ugly or so dangerous to cross as the Susquehanna, and yet a "Flying Column" of two battalions of the Sixth Wurtemberg Infantry, a squadron of the Third Cavalry and a Reserve Battery kept the German, or Right, bank of the Rhine inviolate during the Franco-German War. In fact, this Wurtemberg detachment of the "Black Forest" created a general panic all over Alsatia, in which the Seventh (Douay's) Corps [French] was involved. Only once, 31st August, did the French *Franc-Tireurs*, favored by a thick fog, succeed in crossing the Rhine and they retreated very quickly after doing infinitesimal damage.

"By making constant demonstrations of various kinds, changing position almost daily, making forced night marches and countermarches along the river, and by suddenly appearing and vanishing at a great many points, this little column continued to create for itself a certain amount of importance in the minds of the French, so that it was by them soon magnified into the "Corps d'Armée of the Black Forest," and created in Alsatia no slight alarm and an apprehension that a passage of the Upper Rhine was contemplated by the Germans. As will be seen further on, the exaggerated accounts of the concentration of large bodies of troops in the Black Forest, current in France, and which were wholly owing to the untiring activity of this Detachment, were the real cause of the sudden retreat of the Second and Third Divisions of the French Seventh Corps d'Armée from Mühlhausen to Bel-fort."

After the Wurtemberg Black Forest Detachment had been

broken up, one, the Second Battalion of the Sixth Baden Infantry, and the Reserve Battery of Artillery, sufficed to guard a river shore from Basel to Rastadt, one hundred miles. Is it any exaggeration to claim that a veteran division from the "Army of Northern Virginia" could have effectually defended the crossings of the Susquehanna from above Harrisburg to its mouth—at all events for a sufficient space of time to have enabled Lee to obtain such a start that it would have been impossible for Meade to overtake him? This was the more probable since Meade was making arrangements to concentrate on Pipe Creek—sixteen miles before reaching Gettysburg, where, as General Doubleday says, in his testimony before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," "It appears to me that the result of occupying that line (Pipe Creek) would have been that the enemy would simply have let us *severely alone* and either have taken Harrisburg or gone on *ad infinitum* plundering the State of Pennsylvania."

Kearny had indicated such a course in his letter written a whole year previous, and Swinton, who appears to have been, more than any other writer, in the secrets of the Rebels, says, at page 321, of his and Pond's "Twelve Battles," that Lee originally designed crossing the Susquehanna and (326) was desirous of husbanding his strength for the execution of his ulterior purpose, [since it was not a mere blow and return [a "sortie"] that the Confederates meditated, but a permanent lodgment on Northern soil]. Indeed, it is affirmed that the Confederates were promised recognition, if Lee could establish himself on Northern soil in the Loyal States, north of Mason and Dixon's line.

Meade was actually affording every chance to Lee to carry out his original intention, when Lee, always a "blunderer," according to Lossing (Vol. II., p. 101, No. 2,) and "smitten by idiocy" at Gettysburg, as Lieut.-Gen. Dick Taylor, son of the Buena Vista General and President Taylor, insinuates at p. 230 of his "Personal Experiences of the Late War," threw away all the magnificent advantages which fortune had vouchsafed and placed on his hands and precipitated the battle upon Meade—a battle which the latter would gladly have avoided at the point where it occurred. Thus Lee, at his own expense, made the reputation of Meade, and re-established the North at the expense of the most devoted army that ever followed an over-estimated leader, in whom it nevertheless implicitly trusted.

Swinton and other wiseacres say that Lee's forward was arrested and that he was enticed to Gettysburg through a blind dread of being cut off from his base, as soon as his communications were menaced. This is sufficient to prove that Lee was no genius or first-class general.

The majority of all the truly great achievements in war, in reliable history, all the magnificent thunderbolt shocks which have settled questions in regard to the destinies of nations and let loose the torrents of force to desolate and overturn, or civilize and establish, have been absolute strokes of audacity, complete "cuttings loose" from theoretical bases. Alexander, Frederic the Great and Napoleon—likewise two lesser lights, considered lesser ones by human ignorance, but equal to the first three in individual common sense, intelligence, self-consciousness of power—moved to their most marvellous achievements from *practical* bases in total disregard to *theoretical* bases. Wellington, throughout his triumphant operations in Spain, had no fixed base, since his base was the navy. Even so the finest campaign of our great war, involving a succession of victorious collisions, was Grant's campaign from the South against Vicksburg, where his base was his steamers on the Mississippi; a campaign which, undertaken previously from a fixed base, ended in the fiasco of Holly Springs. Hannibal, greatest of generals of all time, according to Napoleon, Frederic the Great, Wellington, and all the experts in war, moved like a shuttle, as did in a measure Frederic for about six years. The great Prussian had no more of a base than he made for the time being, and he never hesitated to cut loose from any base when he launched to victory. It was by converting such an idea into a reality—an idea expressed in Holy Writ as to spiritual success, "the Kingdom of Heaven [*as it were*] suffereth violence and the violent [*persevering, ardent, energetic*] take it by force. (Matthew xi. 12.) Moreover, the engineering art and science were in their infancy two hundred years ago. All the great leaders of the Thirty Years' War never hesitated to cut loose from their bases when they were determined to accomplish great results. In many respects the rules which applied to the great German War are pertinent to the Great American Conflict, since, in many respects, the latter presents a marked resemblance to the former, especially in its confusion of details and in its want of system during the first two years; in the total absence of a grand, general, digested plan. Had Torstenson paid any attention to his communications in 1644, he would not have conquered Denmark, nor recuperated his army in Holstein, nor have ruined the Imperial armies. Again, nothing made the peace, concluded in 1648, possible but Torstenson's plunging loose into Bohemia to gain his crowning victory almost in sight of its capital and carrying the horrors of war down to the Danube and up to the walls of Vienna. Similar conduct, had he been let alone, would have taken Moreau to Vienna in 1800. Such resolution enabled Napoleon to dictate the peace of Campo Formio in 1797; of Pressburg in 1805; of Tilsit in 1807; of Vienna in

1809, &c., and always actuated Suwarrow. Had Suwarrow paid any attention to theoretical rules of war, he never would have swept the French out of Italy in five months, as he did in 1800. Generals, possessed simply of talent, conquer at times by obedience to rules; generals of genius triumph by ignoring them. Had Blucher been the slave to the theoretical principles of war, as ordinary generals invariably are, he never would have carried the Prussian eagles from the Oder to the French capital in 1813-14, from Ligny to Waterloo in 1815, and thence to Paris in 1815. This miserable subserviency to iron-clad rule, allowed Lee to escape after Antietam (Lee's Cunning, Gould's Alison, 80) in 1862, after Gettysburg in 1863. It proved McClellan was no general, Meade no general in any grand sense of the word, as Geo. H. Thomas always showed himself to be, or as other men of the same ever trustworthy class. The contrary—the principle of Ecclesiasticus (x. 26), “be not slow to act on an emergency,”—made Grant supreme general, and Sherman lieutenant-general. * * Lee became great in the estimation of the ignorant masses through the horrible blunders of those opposed to him. No more is needed to prove that Lee was anything but great than his campaign in West Virginia in 1861; or his letting McClellan escape in 1862; or his not going to Philadelphia in 1863; or his going to Gettysburg in the same year, and his fighting an offensive battle there, or any battle at all in this district. [The moral effect of Lee's movement on Philadelphia would have been momentous, for as a world accepted expert has declared with truth, the effect of the *moral* to the *physical* is as three to one. Such a movement would have demoralized the North and invested treason with a strength which it seems upon calm consideration could scarcely have been met or overcome. The Army of the Potomac could only have been reinforced with good troops from the West. This would have occasioned new complications, and would the administration have had the courage to act like the Roman Senate after Cannæ and stand fast and firm because any relief at the crisis required time—“time the hardest horse to beat.” The weakest point in our national armies was the necessity of defending Washington, a necessity which has become inevitable from *political* nor military necessity.]

Lee's campaign in Western Virginia in 1861, was a failure, and the hopes centered on him were signally disappointed. The Confederate historian of the war, Pollard, commenting on Lee's failure to attack Rosecrans, says (I., 171): “Thus the second opportunity of a decisive battle in Western Virginia *was blindly lost*, General Lee making no attempt to follow up the enemy who had so skillfully eluded him; the excuse alleged for his not doing so

being mud, swollen streams, and the leanness of his artillery horses." See Lossing 11, 101, 2.]

Lee should have crossed the Susquehanna. The writer never hesitated to say so. He pronounced this judgment an hundred times since the Army of Northern Virginia broke across the Potomac in 1863, and urged as the most conclusive proof that Lee was not a great general in the highest sense—in the sense in which he is regarded by the South and by sympathizers at home and abroad—as the most satisfactory evidence, the simple fact that he did not cross the Susquehanna in June–July, 1863, and try for Philadelphia; aye further on, and, if necessary, *come back by water*, following the example of the greatest strategist of antiquity—Alexander, who had to bring back his plunder from India coastwise in ships guarded by a remnant of the veterans who had seen the "elephant" in its home and despoiled it. This return by sea has been considered by some critics as by no means a chimerical plan. A rapid march on Philadelphia would have doubtless given him steamers enough to begin the enterprise. It would not have been difficult to escape in steamers if Lee had been very rapid in his movements. A column sent down the west bank of the Delaware, and thence across to Newcastle, could have posted batteries which could have sunk any but regular war steamers which attempted to escape to sea, and, after that, it would be a mere question of patriotism whether Northerners would sacrifice their wealth, as Rotopschin did his own and that of his peers and fellow citizens in Moscow, to prevent its benefiting the enemy, and thus checkmate the victorious invader; or whether they would yield it in the hope of attaining a larger influence in the conqueror's train and, by even baser than Southern adulation, thus rise in his estimation over his original followers.

Alexander sacrificed those who assisted him to conquer, and without whom he could not have become so great, because they resented and resisted their being supplanted by his deposition of them in favor of the elevation of the supple Persians and farther Easterns; considering that such favorites were unworthy of an influence even equal, much less superior, to their own. Why? Because men like Parmenio and Clitus were of stern stuff, unsuitable to "a republican court," whereas such flatterers as Callisthenes of Olynthus were fit for any court. The former died loyal, and the latter naturally degenerated into conspirators, just as the Copperheads at the North were more ultra and baser in their views than the Southerners proper, out-Heroding Herod, and meaner than the worst Secession elements.

Summa, Lee was neither a great man nor a great leader of men, as such terms must be applied to GEORGE H. THOMAS, to whom are most applicable the ringing lines of Browning:

" Thither our path lies—wind we up the heights—
 Wait ye the warning?
 Our low life was the level's and the night's;
 He's for the morning!
 Step to a tune, square shoulders, erect the head,
 'Ware the beholders!
This is our MASTER, famous, calm and dead,
 Borne on our shoulders,
 Here's the *top peak!* * *
 Bury *this MAN there!*
Lofty designs must close in like effects;
 Loftily lying,
 Leave him—*still loftier than the world suspects,*
 Living and dying!"

NOTES.

(NOTE 1, page 2.) To demonstrate the almost incalculable value of a base on the sea, when the Continental Dominion of Denmark was completely overrun by Tilly and Wallenstein, the Danish navy was still so much a source of trouble to the Imperialists as to exert a most favorable influence upon the Peace of Lubeck, 7th June, 1629. Again, the defence of Stralsund, which broke the back of Wallenstein's hitherto invincibility and cost him twelve thousand of his best troops, was only rendered possible by the fact that the town was always open to reinforcements and supplies by the Baltic. For nearly a century, Sweden fought almost a life and death struggle to keep the Russians from getting possession of any part of the coast of the Baltic, being well aware that the moment that the Czar had ports on that, the East Sea, Sweden itself was no longer secure. It was the base of the sea that made England a nest of hornets against Spain under Elizabeth and a deadly weapon against Napoleon. The British ships enabled the 10,000 to 15,000 Spaniards of the Marquis de la Romana to escape from the clutches of the tyrant in Denmark, 17th–20th August, 1808, at Nyborg and Svenborg, to embark on the British fleet and return to assist in freeing their Fatherland, in fact checked, crushed the arch-traitor to liberty, the false Frenchman, typical Corsican, and finally, over the sea bore him to where he died the victim, not of his captivity, but of his own real littleness which cramped and burned him out on the far distant isle in mid-ocean.

(NOTE 2, page 4.) "History of the Civil Wars in Germany," 1630–35, from the Manuscript Memoirs of a Shropshire Gentleman,

page 70. "And pray what news had you at *Vienna*?" asked Gustavus Adolphus, * * * what is the common opinion there [at Vienna] about these affairs?" "The common people are terrified to the last degree," replied the English Volunteer, and when your Majesty took *Frankfort upon Oder* [April, 1631], if your army had marched but 20 miles into *Silesia*, half the people would have run out of Vienna, and I left them fortifying it." How much more true this of the feeling in Vienna after Leipsic and the Lech? Cardinal Passman, on receiving the news of the Passage of the Lech, exclaimed, "*Factum est!*" (It is all over!)

The great German Jomini or Tactician, H. D. von Bulow, declared that the Passage of the Lech displayed the highest tactical ability on the part of the Swedes; but the subsequent utilization thereof was not strictly strategical. General Horn was correct. He wanted Gustavus to march against Wallenstein in Bohemia, clear away that, the only obstacle, an army newly drawn together, and march on Vienna.

(NOTE 3, page 4.) "I would have far preferred," said Oxenstiern, "to have paid homage to your Majesty within the walls of Vienna in the heart of the Austrian Monarchy, than here [in Frankfurt] on the banks of the Main, so far distant from the real *objective* (Ziele) of the War."— "Swedischer Plutarch" (Oxenstierna), by J. F. von Lundblad, Stralsund 1831, page 66. "Gustav Adolf der Grosse," by von Rango, Leipsic, 1824, page 334. "Gustav II. Adolf: in Germany," by von Bulow, Vol. II, page 32. "Minutes of the Council in 1650," Palmstr. Mss., t. 190. Geijer, 271 (I). Putnam's "Gindely," II., 143.

(NOTE. "LECH, BRIDGING, &c.," page 5.)

The following account of the Bridging of the Lech, in 1632, by Gustavus Adolphus, was discovered in a rare book entitled, "The History of the Civil Wars in Germany from the year 1630-1635. Written by a Shropshire Gentleman. Newark: Printed by James Tomlinson for the Publisher in 1782." In this book was pasted the following manuscript note:

"E. Staveley, the Editor, informed me that he was once a substantial farmer and dealt a little in the corn trade, but through losses, &c., had failed; that the Mss. from which this was printed was found among the refuse of the library of Ld (Lord) Abingdon at Naith when that estate was sold about the year 1762 and given to him, the Editor, by Collingwood, the Steward. 2-97. 17-10½. J. L. (S?) Freeman."

This book must have belonged to the library of my grandfather, Hon. John Watts, Junior, and come to him from Lord Abingdon, with whom he was connected and with whom my great grandfather, Hon. John Watts, Senior, Member of the King's Council, N. Y.,

was in constant correspondence at the breaking out of the American Revolution. The letters of my great grandfather, Hon. John Watts, Senior, to Lord Abingdon, picked up by accident in London, were considered so valuable by the Massachusetts Historical Society that they were published in their Vol. X., Fourth Series, 1871.

The author of the original manuscript was an Englishman, who first took service with the Great King as a simple Volunteer, and finally rose to command a regiment under him. He afterwards distinguished himself in the Army of Charles I., during the Great English Rebellion, 1650.

"I shall be the longer in relating this account of the *Lech*, being esteemed in those days as great an action as any battle or siege of that age, and particularly famous for the disaster of the gallant old General *Tilly*; and for that I can be more particular in it than other accounts, having been an eye-witness to every part.

"The King being truly informed of the dispositions of the *Bavarian* army, was once of the mind to have left the banks of the *Lech*, have repassed the *Danube*, and so sitting down before *Ingolstat*, the Duke's capital city, by the taking that strong town to have made his entrance into *Bavaria*, and the conquest of such a fortress, one entire action; but the strength of the place and the difficulty of maintaining his leaguer in an enemy's country, while *Tilly* was so strong in the field, diverted him from that design, he therefore concluded that *Tilly* was first to be beaten out of the country, and then the siege of *Ingolstat* would be the easier.

"Whereupon, the King resolved to go and view the situation of the enemy; his Majesty went out the 2nd of *April* with a strong party of horse, which I had the honor to command; we marched as near as we could to the banks of the river, not to be too much exposed to the enemy's cannon, and having gained a little height, where the whole course of the river might be seen, the King halted, and commanded to draw up. His Majesty alighted, and calling me to him, examined every reach and turning of the river by his [field] glass, but finding it run a long and almost a straight course, he could find no place that he liked, but at last turning himself north, and looking down the stream, he found the river fetching a long reach, doubles short upon itself, making a round and very narrow point, "There's a point will do our business (said the King), and if the ground be good I will pass there, let *Tilly* do his worst."

"He immediately ordered a small party of horse to view the ground, and to bring him word particularly how high the bank was on each side and at the point; and he shall have 50 dollars,

says the King, that will bring me word how deep the water is. I asked his Majesty leave to let me go, which he would by no means allow; but as the party were drawing out, a sergeant of dragoons told the King, if he pleased to let him go disguised as a boor, he would bring him an account of everything he desired. The King liked the motion very well, and the fellow being well acquainted with the country, puts on a ploughman's habit, and went away immediately with a long poll [pole] upon his shoulder; the horse lay all this while in the woods, and the King stood undiscerned by the enemy on the little hill aforesaid. The dragoon with his long poll comes down boldly to the bank of the river, and calling to the centinels which *Tilly* had placed on the other bank, talked with them, asked if they could not help him over the river, and pretended he wanted to come to them; at last, being come to the point where, as I said, the river makes a short turn, he stands parleying with them a great while, and sometimes pretended to wade over, he puts his long poll into the water, then finding it pretty shallow, pulls off his hose [trousers] and goes in, still thrusting his poll in before him, till being got up to the middle, he could reach beyond him, where it was too deep, and so shaking his head, comes back again. The soldiers on the other side laughing at him, asked him if he could swim. He said no. Why, you fool you, says one of the centinels, *the channel of the river is twenty feet deep*. How do you know that, says the dragoon. Why our engineer, says he, measured it yesterday. This was what he wanted, but not yet fully satisfied; aye, but, says he, may be it may not be very broad, and if one of you would wade in to meet me till I could reach you with my poll, I would give him half a ducat to pull me over. The innocent way of his discourse so deluded the soldiers that one of them immediately strips and goes in up to the shoulders, and our dragoon goes in on this side to meet him; but the stream took the other soldier away, and he being a good swimmer, came over to this side. The dragoon was then in a great deal of pain for fear of being discovered, and was once going to kill the fellow, and make off; but at last resolved to carry on the humor, and having entertained the man with a tale of a tub, about the *Swedes* stealing his oats, the fellow being cold wanted to be gone, and he as willing to be rid of him, pretended to be very sorry he could not get over the river, and so makes off. "By this, however, he learned both the depth and breadth of the channel, the bottom and nature of both shores, and everything the King wanted to know; we could see him from the hill by our glasses very plain, and could see the soldier naked with him: he is a fool, says the King, he does not kill the fellow and run off; but when the dragoon told his tale, the King was ex-

tremely well satisfied with him, gave him 100 dollars and made him a quarter-master to a troop of cuirassiers.

"The King having farther examined the dragoon, he gave him a very distinct account of the ground on this side, which he found to be higher than the enemy's by 10 or 12 feet, and a hard gravel. Hereupon the King resolved to pass there, and in order to it gives, himself, particular directions for such a bridge as I believe never army passed a river on before or since.

"His bridge was only loose planks laid upon large tressels in the same homely manner I have seen bricklayers raise a low scaffold to build a brick wall; the tressels were made higher than one another to answer to the river as it becomes deeper or shallower, and was all framed and fitted before any appearance was made of attempting to pass.—When all were ready the King brings his army down to the bank of the river, and plants his cannon as the enemy had done, some here and some there, to amuse them.

"At night, *April* 4th, the King commanded about 2000 men to march to the point, and to throw up a trench on either side, and quite round it with a battery of six pieces of cannon at each end, beside three small mounts, one at the point and one at each side, which had each two pieces upon them. This work was begun so briskly, and so well carried on, the King firing all night from the other parts of the river, that by daylight all the batteries at the new work were mounted, the trench lined with 2000 musqueteers, and all the utensils [materials] of the bridge lay ready to be put together.

"Now the *Imperialists* discovered the design, but it was too late to hinder it, the musqueteers in the great trench, and the five new batteries, made such continual fire that the other bank, which, as before, lay 12 feet below them, was too hot for the *Imperialists*, whereupon *Tilly*, to be provided for the King at his coming over, falls to work in a wood right against the point, and raises a great battery for 20 pieces of cannon, with a breast-work, or line, as near the river as he could, to cover his men, thinking that when the King had built his bridge he might easily beat it down with his cannon.

"But the King had doubly prevented him, first by *laying his bridge so low* that none of *Tilly's* shot could hurt it; for *the bridge lay not above half a foot above the water's surface*, by which means the King, who in that showed himself an excellent engineer, had secured it from any batteries being made within the land, and the angle of the bank secured it from the remoter batteries, on the other side, and the continual fire of the cannon and small shot, beat the *Imperialists* from their station just against it, they having no works to cover them.

“And in the second place, to secure his passage, he sent over about 200 men, and after that 200 more, who had orders to cast up a large ravelin on the other bank, just where he designed to land his bridge; this was done with such expedition too, that it was finished before night, and in a condition to receive all the shot of *Tilly's* great battery, and effectually covered his bridge. While this was doing the King on his side lays over his bridge. Both sides wrought hard all day and all night, as if the spade, not the sword, had been to decide the controversy, and that he had got the victory whose trenches and batteries were first ready; in the mean time the cannon and musquet bullets flew like hail, and made the service so hot, that both sides had enough to do to make their men stand to their work; the King in the hottest of it, animated his men by his presence, and *Tilly*, to give him his due, did the same; for the execution was so great and so many officers killed, General *Attringer* [*Aldringer*] wounded, and two sergeant-majors killed, that at last *Tilly* himself was obliged to be exposed and to come up to the very face of our line to encourage his men, and give his necessary orders.

“And here about 1 o'clock, much about the time that the King's bridge and works were finished, and just as they said he had ordered to fall on upon our ravelin with 3000 foot, was the brave old *Tilly* slain with a musquet bullet in the thigh [knee]; he was carried off to *Ingolstat*, and lived some days after, but died of the wound the same day that the King had his horse shot under him at the siege of that town.

“We made no question of passing the river here, having brought everything so forward, and with such extraordinary success, but we should have found it a very hot piece of work if *Tilly* had lived one day more; and if I may give my opinion of it, having seen *Tilly's* battery and breast-work, in the face of which we must have passed the river, I must say that whenever we had marched, if *Tilly* had fallen in with his horse and foot, placed in that trench, the whole army would have passed as much in danger as in the face of a strong town in the storming a counterscarp. The King himself, when he saw with what judgment *Tilly* had prepared his works, and what danger he must have run, would often say, that day's success was every way equal to the victory of *Leipsick*.

“*Tilly* being hurt and carried off, as if the soul of the army had been lost, they began to draw off; the Duke of *Bavaria* took horse and rode away as if he had fled out of battle for life.” (Pages 110-117.)

Since the publication of my Collection of Notes on “Bridging and Fording,” constituting an Appendix to the Pamphlet edited by

me, "Sailors' Creek to Appomattox Court House," being "War Memoranda" by General H. Edwin Tremain, and my "La Royale," Part VIII., treating of the Surrender at Appomattox Court House, the following letter, dated Weathersfield, Vermont, 27th June, 1886, has been received from Col. Leavitt Hunt, who was senior Aid-de-Camp to General Heintzleman, first Commandant of the Third Corps.

"When I was in the Federal (Swiss) Military School or West Point Academy "*Fortbildungsschule*" at Thun of which I am or was the only foreign graduate (except Louis Napoleon), I had the experience of throwing a ponton bridge over 150 [feet] long (and on which all arms [infantry, cavalry and artillery] traversed) in *twenty-two minutes*, the current [of the Aare] seven miles an hour. The interesting point was that it was the fastest current on which it is safe to throw such bridge, so they taught.

"Your tradition of experience in throwing a bridge of wagons over the Mohawk [mentioned among J. W. de P.'s anecdotes of "Bridging and Forging," page xl.], as attested by Lewis N. Morris, is interesting, because he lived from about 1807 five (25?) miles below us on the Connecticut, on a fine estate, and had for his third wife my aunt, eldest daughter of my grandfather, Governor Hunt, of Vermont. She died about twenty years ago."

(NOTE 4, page 5.) "Be not slow to act on an emergency," says Ecclesiasticus (x. 26) and if ever a battle was won and lost in obedience to, or violation of, this principle, Chancellorsville was. Again and again the Rebels exposed their unprotected flanks to mortal blows and none were delivered. Webb, among others, saw opportunities, as Stuart advanced against Sickles and the Third Corps at Hazel Grove, begged to be permitted to strike, and was forbidden and withheld.

A summing-up of the battle of CHANCELLORSVILLE, as a military criticism, may be of interest at this date, as Chancellorsville and Gettysburg are inseparably connected; the latter was the result of the first. Hooker's plan for this battle was perfect; equal to any simple or single stroke ever conceived by any of the greatest captains. It was in the exact style of the most consummate generals; bold, brilliant and bewildering to Lee. The practical-strategy which left Sedgwick in front of Fredericksburg, to amuse Lee and chain his attention, coupled with the demonstrations of the First and Third Corps, while the rest of the Army of the Potomac were carried over the Rappahannock and Rapidan, and planted across the lines of communication and supply of the Army of Northern Virginia, were unsurpassed in merit, both of conception and execution. The quiet abstraction of the Third Corps from the force in front of Lee, and its transferral to swell the mass in his

rear and make the event more certain, was a manœuvre considered worthy of citation.

On the morning of Friday, the first of May, Hooker held Lee, as it were, in the hollow of his hand. All he had to do was to close his fingers and compress the Rebel leader's throat, and his orders of that morning read as though he comprehended what had to be done and as if he was about to do the thing that was right, viz.: to get his army out of the woods (the Wilderness) into the clearings; to advance through the comparatively open country, swinging forward his right to co-operate with Sedgwick in closing the Bowling Green road; to close in upon Lee, as the Prussians narrowed the circle of their hunt until they shut Bazaine up in Metz; until they crippled and took McMahan in Sedan. Up to this point all was lovely, that is up to 2. P. M., Friday, May 1st.

Had Hooker gone ahead, he had troops enough to meet Lee, the more particularly as the Third Corps was rapidly coming up in reserve.

A simultaneous attack by Hooker from the west, Sedgwick from the east, Hooker's right closing in and giving the hand to Sedgwick's left, thus completing the circuit on the south, while the Rappahannock precluded escape to the north. Such a vigorous nip would have made Chancellorsville another Ulm, or Sedan, in the open field.

Hooker had 48,000 men, besides the Third Corps 18,000, equal to 66,000; Lee 49,000 or 50,000 facing West; Sedgwick 25,000 to 30,000, besides the First Corps, not yet withdrawn, 17,000, equal to 42,000 to 47,000, to crush Early with 9,000 to 10,000 facing East.

The fearful mistake of the recall of the advance or attack of Friday noon on Hooker's side, is chargeable to the Union commander. This is his own fault and cannot be shifted in whole or part to any other shoulders. It was an awful military error. Perhaps—taking into consideration circumstances, possibilities, probabilities—viewed, weighed and judged from a strictly military standpoint, it was the greatest mistake of the war. Still it may be entirely excused or satisfactorily explained on other than military grounds, for no one, except those within the Ring, can know what reasons, moral influences, actuated Hooker—led to this, for him, ruinous reversal of the programme.

The dispositions of Friday p. m. for defensive battle, if anything could excuse the passage from an exhilarating offensive to a depressing defensive, were well enough. The whole paralysis of Saturday, both as regards Sedgwick and Hooker, are inexplicable and inexcusable, supposing Hooker to have been himself, which the writer has always doubted; not *over-stimulated*—no, no, no; but *wanting* stimulants—tired out or worn down.

Jackson's flank march with 30,000 veterans and his attack on the Union right on Saturday evening were magnificent, but not more magnificent than SICKLES' and PLEASANTON'S stoppage of his onward; the latter with twenty-two guns and 1,000 troopers.

Lee's separation of his army should have inevitably insured his defeat, just as the dispositions of the French army, in 1870, under McMahon and Frossard, right and left, without a centre, scarcely feeling to each other, occasioned its utter overthrow, dissolution and dispersion, and was the dawn of the noon at Sedan.

Lee's dislocation of his forces on Saturday could have had but one result—disastrous defeat—had there been a Gustavus, a Torsenson, a Traun, a Frederic, a Massena, a Dessaix, a Thomas, or a von Moltke at the head of the Union army.

The nocturnal operations of the Third Corps on Saturday night 2d-3d May, were, *in pecto*, as daring and effective as the preceding action of Jackson on a grander scale.

The order to abandon Hazel Grove on Sunday morning, 3d May, was on a par with many other of the military madnesses of the campaign; but necessary, if its maintenance was not to be, or could not be, adequately supported. The latter was not the case. If it was held, Lee was split in two. His left, assaulting Hazel Grove and Chancellorsville, was exposed to a *crushing flank attack* from Reynolds with the First Corps, 17,000 strong, fresh and ready. Reynolds here laid himself open to a similar rebuke that Lord Raglan launched at Lord Lucan after his prodigal expenditure of the British cavalry at Balaklava. Lee's right—20,000—held by a thin skirmish line under MILES, in front, was open to an annihilating blow in rear from Sedgwick, had the latter obeyed orders, shown any head or any alacrity. At 7, A. M., Sunday, May 3d, it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to have dissolved the Army of Northern Virginia. Say Lee had still, all told, 50,000. Of these, 30,000 under Stuart, minus losses (A. H. G. says 27,000), were attacking Sickles' 18,000 and Slocum and French from the East, say together 30,000; 20,000 under his (Lee's) own supervision; Slocum and Hancock, say 15,000, from the East; while 10,000 were confronting, not as yet fighting, Sedgwick. On the *right flank* of Stuart, Reynolds could have thrown 17,000, equal in their fire and freshness to 25,000 fasting, fought-out troops. Thus Jackson's successor would have been compressed between forces eleven to six, equal, under the circumstances, to two (Union) to his one (Rebel). Meanwhile Lee's 10,000 would have been faced by Slocum and Hancock, say 13,000, and *flanked* by Meade, 12,000 fresh and good troops—overwhelming odds, over two to one. Sedgwick had, at first, nearly three to Early's one.

Sedgwick has done nothing; *Reynolds and Meade were not used, did nothing.* The Eleventh Corps is counted out after 1, P. M., Saturday, 2d May. *The crisis was at 9, A. M., Sunday, 3d May.* No Sedgwick yet—not even heard from; Hooker disabled. From this hour Hooker is not responsible. *Couch is now, henceforward, in a primary degree, answerable.* It was the case of the sick St. Arnaud after the Alma and before Sebastopol. No successor willing to take the responsibility or act, consequently everything went awry. *Meade was, in a secondary degree, responsible; then Reynolds, even Reynolds;* he might have played the part of the Maharbal of Placentia and Thrasymene and other victorious fields; of Richepanse at Hohenlinden; of Kellerman at Marengo; of Blucher at Waterloo. Sedgwick could have come in, as, at least, Kleist at Culm, and Lee would have gone up like Vandamme; *SICKLES at Hazel Grove (Chancellorsville) and the PEACH ORCHARD (Gettysburg) playing the noble part of Osterman, at Culm, which dissolved all Napoleon's plans, and like the gallant Russian losing a limb.*

Italian independence failed of success at Santa Lucia, 6th May, 1848, through just exactly such a want of simultaneousness of the aggressive. Whoever will take the trouble to study out the phases of the brief campaign from Goito (8th April, 1848) to Custozza-Somma Campagna, 25th July, not the Custozza fight of 24th July—will find the same violations of military rules and common sense, and very many perfect parallels distributed over a long space of time, but having the same fatal results to the Italian cause as to the Union cause at Chancellorsville. Carlo Alberto began well, like Hooker; *lost the impulse and inspiration of the aggressive; subsided into an inoffensive defensive, and "went up,"* just as Hooker did. It took a little longer, but the course of events and the result were the same.

Although Sedgwick was three hours behind hand, give him every possible excuse, and although he had lost so much time, there was still time enough to do something decisive all day on Sunday, had whoever possessed the power co-operated to the same end. Lee had reunited his 40,000 at noon, but still they formed a concave encircling and opposed to an egg-point convex, comprising 60,000 good, nay, excellent troops. At 2, P. M., this 40,000 was reduced to 27,000, and Sedgwick was opposed to 23,000 to 25,000; for, heaping error on error, he had left 5,000 behind.

Awful spectacle at 4, P. M.—70,000 paralyzed by 20,000, while within six miles a battle had come on between Early, or rather Wilcox, McLaws, Mahone, and Sedgwick, which might have been made as decisive for the Union cause as any other collision, had our main army only moved. Stunned, it seemed, all Sunday after-

noon; stupefied almost all Monday, Sedgwick fighting one to one when he might have had two to one, had he kept Gibbon in hand and been reinforced by Banks' Ford. The latter movement would have taken the Rebel line at any time on Monday morning in flank and rolled it up Rosbach style, and even Missionary Ridge style, when Hooker fell on Bragg's right flank.

Curious spectacle—Hooker quiescent in his *pan-coupée*; Lee watching him in his crescent, parallel to its flattened or excised triangle; McLaws and Mahone six miles from Hooker, confronting two sides of Sedgwick's U or hollow square, of which the Rappahannock constituted the fourth side or base; Early, the third side, paying no attention to Gibbon, who, finally, had put the river between him and the fight, and who, if he had been a little further back and higher up, and had the ground favored, might have looked on a grand gladiatorial encounter with firearms—just as Vendome observed of a large portion of the French army at Oudenarde and Hooker of 30,000 of the Union army at Williamsburg—whereas he ought to have fallen on Early's rear in co-operation with Sedgwick.

Gibbon might, with justice, say he had our camps and stores to protect. Often the temptation of plundering a camp has given a victory to the party who lost their *impedimenta*, all their traps. Janikau, Sohr, Shiloh, Cedar Creek, are four among many examples of what such conveying of a neighbor's goods often costs an apparently successful army.

Tuesday, May 5, Hooker or Couch, or Couch-Meade still quiet. Sedgwick back across the river. Had Sedgwick only held on, Hooker might have recrossed to the North bank at United States Ford, marched down the left bank, crossed again to the South side at Banks' Ford, and fought a new battle on the plateau midway Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, in a comparatively open country.

Wednesday, May 6th, the Army of the Potomac home across the Rappahannock.

Result—a moral victory to the Rebels, worth, at this time, a real one; 36,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners, the loss about equally divided. Union gain, the killing of Stonewall Jackson and the flower of the Rebel infantry. The nation's loss, the apparent defeat and red-tape victory, the restoration of the credit of the Commander-in-Chief (who was so severely accused by Burnside and was individually hostile to Hooker), and his return to pristine power.

Fortunately for the loyal party, the same red-tape and Ring which kept down merit and precluded success at the North, was equally in the ascendant at the South. Witness the prompt pro-

motion of such men as Bragg and Pemberton—the tardy justice to their antipodes, the remarkable Gordon and the second Stonewall Jackson, Mahone.

(NOTE to line 4 from bottom of page 5. Sentence ending “single cast of the dice.”)

[“Napoleon was going through the painful experience of a gambler who, after a long run of luck, has calculated every chance and staked handfuls of gold—and then finds himself beaten after all, just because he has played too elaborately.”—Tolstoi’s “War and Peace,” Series III., I., 81.]

(NOTE A. Page 6.) The superiority of old troops, acclimated to suffering and battle, as compared with the best of new troops, can scarcely be sufficiently estimated. Had Tilly not allowed himself to be forced to accept the battle of Leipsic, in 1631, by the taunts and headstrong valor or “fiery nature” of Pappenheim, and had he waited for the arrival of the veterans whom Aldringer and Tiefenbach were leading back to his assistance, from the conquest and sack of Mantua—the hand on the clock of human progress and religious freedom would have been arrested then and there. Never, perhaps, was a violation of the rule to concentrate forces for an impending battle more suddenly punished. Austria lost the whole gain of thirteen years by sending off a veteran army on a good as foreign expedition wherein success could have no influence on the terrible conflict at home. Napoleon modernized pithy maxims as old as war, which is, perhaps, the natural state of man, and one of these was simply this: “When a battle is impending, scrape together every accessible man.”

Had the forces sent to plunder Mantua been kept in Germany, the campaigns of Gustavus, culminating at Leipsic, would have been utterly impossible. Divided forces and counsels, armies frittered away, and perhaps 200,000 troops scattered over vast extents of territory to find subsistence, alone made it possible for the Swedish 30,000 to penetrate into and subjugate the country. Never, except in the Thirty Years’ War, in many respects a perfect parallel to the “Slaveholders’ Rebellion,” was there in any conflict of war such a waste of strength as was again and again displayed by the Imperial States in Europe and by the North in America, and at no time so manifestly as when Halleck drove Hooker to resign by refusing him the control of every man who could be assembled to fall with crushing force upon Lee. When the troops refused to Hooker were accorded to Meade, it was either too late or Meade could not handle them or what he had.

“Yet war was his true vocation. If ever any one was born for war, CHARLES NAPIER was the man. He studied its theory from boyhood. He followed Alexander from the Granicus to the Indus,

and critically analyzed the structure of his campaigns. He had meditated profoundly upon the large principles and strategic laws of war before he was required to put them in practice. The maxims which he evolved in the study were the principles which he afterwards illustrated in the field. And in this, as in everything else—but in *this pre-eminently*—he went at once, with direct decisive insight, to the root of the matter. To the professional student his disquisitions on strategy must prove invaluable; even to the general reader—the laws which regulate a military campaign being not remotely derived from those which rule the still larger campaign of life—they are full of interest! ‘A COMMANDER SHOULD CONCENTRATE HIS OWN FORCES, DIVIDE HIS ENEMIES, AND NEVER THINK HIMSELF STRONG ENOUGH WHEN HE CAN BE STRONGER. Yet he should remember that additional numbers do not always give strength. *Always attack if you cannot avoid an action. If your enemy is strongest, fall on his weakest points, and avoid his strong ones.* [Skoboleff’s maxim.] If you are more powerful, fasten on his vitals, and destroy him. *If he is strong, provoke him to separate; if he is weak, drive him into a corner!*’ These maxims were penned many years before he went to the East; his Scindian campaign was their application.”—“Essays on History and Biography,” by John Skilton, L. L. D. (Edin.), Advocate. Edinburg and London, 1883. Page 278.

[“But force is the product of the mass multiplied by the velocity. And in war the force of the troops is also the product of the mass, but the multiplier is an unknown quantity.”—Tolstoi’s “War and Peace,” Series III., II., 136.]

[“Those who are most eager to fight will always be in the best condition for a struggle. The *Spirit* of the troops is the multiplier which, taking the mass as the multiplicand, will give the strength as a product. The real problem for the Science of War is to ascertain and formulate its value, and it will never be able to do so, until it ceases to substitute for this unknown quantity such factors as the commander’s plan or the accoutrements of the soldier; then only, by expressing certain historical facts by equations and comparing their relative value, can we hope to ascertain that of this unknown x .”—Tolstoi’s “War and Peace,” series III., II., 137.]

[“It would appear that, having rejected the belief of older historians in the submission of People’s to the Divine Will, and in predestined objects—towards the fulfilment of which Mankind is unconsciously borne—modern history ought surely to study and investigate, not so much the fact and manifestation of Power, as the reasons which dominate its existence.”—Tolstoi’s “War and Peace,” Series III., II., 325.]

(NOTE 5, page 8.) ["If Early [9th-10th July, 1864,] had been but *one day* earlier he might have entered the Capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I [Grant] had sent. Whether the *delay* caused by the battle amounted to a *day* or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion by the *defeat* of the troops under him a greater benefit to a cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory."—Grant's "Personal Memoirs," II., 306.]

(NOTE 6, page 10.) ["It is true [spring of 1864] the Confederates had, so far, held their Capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. But previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture PHILADELPHIA, New York and the national Capital, and had made several attempts to do so."—Grant's "Personal Memoirs," II., 177-178.]

In regard to LEE's *objective* being *Philadelphia*, see William Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," page 325, text and note*; likewise his "Twelve Decisive Battles of the War," page 321. Examine in connection with "On to Philadelphia," Colonel Fletcher, B. A., "History of the American War," II. 403; Professor Draper's "Civil War in America," III. 125; Lossing's "Civil War in America," III., 57; Pollard's (Rebel) "Third Year of the War," 22; Grant's "Personal Memoirs," II. 177, 178; Count of Paris, "Civil War in America," 506-523, &c. It remains to be seen what the publication of the Official Records of the Rebellion is going to reveal.

¶ BRIDGING.—The more often and the more closely the critical military mind dwells upon the losses of time and the waste of opportunities between the 2d and 9th of April, and during the flight of Lee and pursuit of Grant, but most particularly at Farmville, throughout pretty much the whole of 7th of April, 1865—near which town the war might, should, could and would have been ended in a blaze of glory, with chief credit to Humphreys and his combined Second and Third Corps and to the better satisfaction of the troops and to the nation—the more vividly occurs to memory the remark of the French marshal, the Duke of Berwick, after a similar failure to profit by, and rejection of, fortunes' offer with both hands full of her best favors.


"The suspension of operations leads inevitably to a conviction as replete with regret as the criticism, so eminently just, so dignified and so temperate, pronounced by Field Marshal the Duke of Berwick, upon the failure, on the part of the French, to profit by their opportunities and attack the Allies at the Abbey de Pure, or Parc, near Louvain, on (seventh) June, 1693. William III. had between fifty and sixty thousand men—only fifty thousand according to some accounts; the French about one hundred and twenty thousand.

"Thereupon Berwick, lamenting the remembrance of such chances absolutely thrown away, remarked: "The King's retreat * * * (was) incomprehensible. As there could have been no good reasons for it, and never having been able to learn any [to justify it], neither from the ministers [of war] (nor from those cognizant of such affairs), nor from the generals, one needs must conclude, that *God did not will the execution of these beautiful plans.*"

The more frequently the parallel of circumstance are considered the more inexplicable Grant's blindness or inertia appears to be. Grant had no genius and his mind did not work quickly. His successes were all won by pouring out blood like water. Nothing was denied to him and he used everything without mercy. With what ease the Appomattox could have been bridged at once in various ways, Humphreys reinforced and Lee destroyed on that spring afternoon, is susceptible of clear proof. As the abutments of the railroad and the wagon road bridge at Farmville were intact, bridges on the cantilever principle (see illustration) were easiest and simplest. There was a superfluity of force, men and teams, and an exuberance of material; tall trees near by to fell for the principal beams, and a town at hand, to demolish, for smaller timber and lumber. There was the enemy, exhausted and depleted, within three miles, held all that afternoon and evening by the combined Second and Third Corps, about one-third as strong, and all this within hearing, almost within sight of a huge army indifferent to the occasion, leaving Humphreys "to take care of himself." Meanwhile all that interposed between glory and inertia was a stream, not deep nor rapid, about one hundred feet wide, which brains and will could have bridged strongly and sufficiently in two hours.

"This [CANTILEVER] bridge at Wangtu is a fine specimen of the Himalayan construction, wherever a solid roadway is required. It is built entirely on the principle of *leverage*. Several large trees are felled on each side of the river, and their trunks are laid on either shore, with the narrower ends [apices] projecting over the river, and heavy stones laid over

the thick ends [butts] to increase their counterweight. Cross-bars of wood are then laid over the projecting ends. Thus the first layer is complete. The process is repeated again and again, each layer of trees projecting some feet beyond the last, till the two sets of timber almost meet in mid-air, and one more layer crowns both. Then planks, laid crosswise from the roadway. The base of the timbers on either side is imbedded in solid masonry. Strong railings guard against accidents, and an excellent substantial bridge is thus formed. The timber generally used is *deodar* [Himalayan *Cedar*], which seems almost imperishable, proof alike against heat and wet, and all other influences tending to decay. *The same principle of bridge-making, but in rough-and-ready style, is to be seen on a small scale on many little streams, such bridges being occasionally rapidly made just when required!* Rough logs are laid on either bank, weighted by stones. On these are laid others, tied together with coarse ropes of goat's-hair [prolonges would answer at a pinch] and, of course, overlapping the first layer, then a final layer unites both. *Still narrower torrents are bridged by a couple of tall trees, felled so as to fall across the stream side by side; on these are laid flat slabs of stone, and the bridge is complete.*"—"In the Himalayas and on the Indian Plains." By C. F. Gordon Cumming. Page 391. London, 1884. N. Y. S. L.



CANTILEVER BRIDGE AT WANDEPORE.

"One of the greatest impediments to the progress of an army in all mountainous districts, is the cataracts, which frequently bound from the hills with an impetuosity that nothing can resist. * * * The engraving [above, of view near Wandepore (Wandipoor), 18 miles east by south of Tassisodon, capital of Boutan] will give some idea of the sort of bridges employed in the vast chains of the Himalaya and Caucasus, being taken in Boutan. The bridge represented in the print is thrown over a rapid stream in these hills [a branch from the north of the Brahmapootra], and is a very favorable specimen of that description of architecture in this mountainous region. Its construction is somewhat singular. Several strong beams are imbedded in masonry, and supported by the rocks on the precipitous banks of the stream. They are securely fixed in the interstices of these natural receptacles, and clamped together by means of strong wooden wedges, inserted into mortises—for there the workmen employ no iron in any of their structures. A space of several inches is left between the beams, which increase in length from the buttress formed by the rocky sides of the channel, the longest on either side reaching to within about a fourth part of the span of the bridge. Planks upwards of two feet wide, are then placed on the uppermost and longest of the projecting beams on each side of the stream; upon these planks small transverse joists are laid, and other planks again placed over them, the whole forming a steady and substantial floor. These bridges may be passed with perfect safety, and are no doubt precisely the same as those employed in the days of Timour."—*Oriental Annual*, for 1837. London.

* While these pages were passing through the press, the writer met his friend, Rear-Admiral Chas. A. Baldwin, U. S. N., 10th-11th August, 1886, at the United States Hotel, Saratoga Springs, N. Y. The admiral said that, while in command of the *Vanderbilt* in pursuit of the "Pirate Semmes," he ran into James Town, St. Helena. Sir Charles Elliot, re-

cently appointed governor, had just arrived from London, having been dropped, a few days previous, by a passing steamer. Sir Charles had been a great deal in America; had been British Commissioner to Texas before its annexation to the United States; had been intimately acquainted with a number of our prominent private citizens and politicians; understood the feelings of the people and the workings of the government; had spent quite a long time in Washington, and knew all the country around, thoroughly, in which the armies were operating in the summer of 1863. In fact, he was completely posted and prepared to talk, and he brought out an extremely good map of Northern Virginia, Maryland and South-Eastern or Southern Pennsylvania. He had, beside this, all the advantage of the latest British official information, up to the time he left London, only a few days previous, and knew that Lee had crossed the border into Pennsylvania with 90,000 to 100,000 of the very best Rebel troops and a thoroughly appointed army. Sir Charles was satisfied that, if the Rebels were successful in the first collision—could win the first battle, which must take place sooner or later—*Philadelphia was their direct objective*; that they must take it; that meanwhile they would ravage the country to their heart's content; that their purpose was not to destroy, but to levy enormous contributions. [A very able educated soldier had previously prophesied, as did Gen. Philip Kearny afterwards, in 1862, that if they were successful in the field, Philadelphia would be the Rebel objective, and the former gentleman told the writer to go to Thurlow Weed from him, an old friend, and say that if the North was not more in earnest in providing adequate troops, "the Pelicans" [alluding to the symbol of Louisiana, the remote Southwest] "would be shaking their tails over New York from the heights of Weehawken." Sir Charles added that the effect of Lee's winning the first battle on Northern soil would throw Maryland into the Rebel hands and give them a great additional force of men. He concluded by emphasizing that the great mistake of the United States government was in paralyzing so many good troops in guarding Harper's Ferry and Washington. The former, he observed, was altogether Halleck's fault, who had Harper's Ferry on the brain. [It was insisting upon leaving a whole strong division at Harper's Ferry and refusing to concede their control to Hooker that led to that general's resignation, although he had already traversed Lee's designs, and threw the Army of the Potomac into the hands of Meade, whose first order was "to have a grand review," and who, according to General Doubleday, wanted to assume a position at Pipe Creek, where Lee might have chosen to let it severely alone and have kept on depredating Pennsylvania after capturing Harrisburg.]

HOOKER'S EFFECT ON GETTYSBURG.

"SAN FRANCISCO, Presidio of S. F., Cal., June 18, 1886.

"Major-General JOSEPH HOOKER, U. S. Army,
"Grand Hotel, San Francisco, Cal.

"Dear General :

"I received your note of the 17th inst. this morning, and I have directed copies of certain papers in my possession to be made for you, and I know no one more entitled to them than yourself, connected as they are with the battle of Gettysburg, up to the dates included in the orders of which you will be sent copies.

"You remember that I was detached from the command of a line division of the Second Army Corps, which I had organized and fought at Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, men of whom Sumner testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that 'the enemy had never seen their backs,' to take command of the troops on Maryland Heights, part the debris of Milroy's Manchester fiasco, and that you followed me there on the 27th June, 1863, and ordered the immediate evacuation of the place, and that the troops, numbering about 11,000 of all arms, should join the Army of the Potomac, then converging towards Emettsburg. Whilst at lunch, at 2 P. M., your order was countermanded by Halleck, and you left for Frederick, where you resigned the command. On the following day, an A. D. C. of General Meade's ordered me to evacuate the Heights, ordering such property as could be put in boats (canal) to be sent to Washington. Leaving General Elliott with 3,000 men to execute the last part of the order, I moved at once with the remaining 8,000 men to Frederick, and immediately put myself *en rapport* with Meade, as the enclosed papers testify. Stretching a line towards Baltimore, on one side of Frederick, and opening communications upon which the Army of the Potomac were dependent for supplies, I sent other troops to occupy South Mountain and other passes, and pushed the cavalry as far as the Potomac, who destroyed the pontoon bridge over which Lee's army had crossed, thus depressing the *morale* of the enemy, whilst our own was proportionately raised—lowered, as it appears in these papers, it had been for the first two or three days of the fight.

"The order placing me in command of the Third Army Corps was given by General Meade, in consequence of my service during the battle of Gettysburg with the Harpers Ferry troops, for demanding whom you were obliged to throw up your command. It is a matter of history, that my 'cordon' shut out Stewart's cavalry from taking any part in the contest, or in the least molesting the base of Meade's operations. The day previous to my

arrival, a train from Baltimore of two hundred wagons had been cut off.

"I have no desire to obtrude my record, my services were given with all the zeal and ability I possessed, but as the war closed places became more valuable to politicians than the men who occupied them and those having most influence secured them.

"To leave a fair reputation for my children will satisfy me, and long since I have ceased to expect more.

"Very sincerely, [Signed.] WM. H. FRENCH,
"Brev't Maj.-Gen'l, U. S. A."

"I certify the foregoing is a true copy of the original, now in my possession.

"J. HOOKER,
"Maj.-Gen'l."

"The following is a copy, if not the identical words, of the substance of my telegram to General Butterfield regarding the cavalry.

"POINT OF ROCKS, June 27th, 1863.

"General BUTTERFIELD,
"Frederick, Md.

"Send the cavalry in the direction of Gettysburg and Emettsburg to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, and to report to me. [Signed.] Maj.-Gen'l HOOKER."

"DEAR BEALE:—In overhauling some war papers I found some that may be of use to you in preparing your address (or which I think should be), the history of that battle, as I think you have, or can soon have all the data necessary for the purpose. Copies of my orders for the advance from Frederick, on three lines of the whole army, can be obtained by application to the Adjutant-General of the Army, and these orders were only departed from by the troops on the most easterly line. See Butterfield's testimony, Vol. I., page 419, series 65. Also, in the same volume, page 329 (near the bottom), General Meade's *singular* testimony: 'that I gave him no information of my plans,' &c., and, also, in the same volume, the report of committee, pages 53, 54, 55. General Butterfield informs me that he delivered the above telegram to General Pleasanton verbally. It seems, therefore, that General Meade only began to blunder the moment he passed from under the influence of my orders. I left him my plans, my orders, my staff and my army (except two aides-de-camp).

"Yours truly and sincerely, "J. HOOKER,
"Maj.-Gen'l."

SICKLES AT GETTYSBURG.

“If you had asked me as to my opinion of that battle [Gettysburg] I would have answered decidedly in favor of Sickles, and would say that no man with a military eye that takes in the topography of the battlefield of Gettysburg but could see at once the necessity of Sickles occupying the *high* Peach Orchard ground. Had he not done so, Lee would have planted his artillery there and have swept our army from the gradual sloping plain below from our left to our right flank, cutting us to pieces by a flank fire. I have never seen a better position to accomplish this, than in the lay of this land, and have been told that it was Lee's plan to do so, for he had looked at it. *I have no question of doubt but Sickles by this move saved to our army the day.*”

“You know that my command was on the left-centre, at the Emetsburg road, and that the destruction of my 11th New Jersey Regiment was from a flank fire; the *front* fire from Barksdale's command was severe, but the *flank* fire was terrible. I am sure that General Sickles will win this contest [discussion as to his advance] as he did at Gettysburg.”

Extract from a letter of Major-General Robert McAllister, of New Jersey, to General J. Watts de Peyster, dated 31st August, 1886.

“General Sickles did not send misleading orders to his commander of the Second Division (General Humphreys), on the occasion of his night march to Gettysburg, July 1st, at which time Humphreys nearly marched his division within the Confederate lines. The proof of my assertion is the published report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, wherein General Humphreys testifies ‘that the error was his own’ in not correctly construing General Sickles’ order. This fact should settle that point for all time. If it is true that General Sickles ‘did receive orders from General Meade assigning him to his position—in substance to continue Hancock’s left and cover Round Top’—it is also true that such position was untenable. It was low, swampy ground, entirely commanded at short rifle range by the Emetsburg ridge, which commanding ground it was the enemy’s intention to gain by Longstreet’s attack. Sickles, knowing that the ground assigned him offered no advantage for attack or defence, with the instinct of the true soldier, promptly advanced his corps and occupied that important commanding ground, and there received the enemy’s attack. He fought his corps of 10,000 splendidly, losing in killed and wounded 4,280—and held it against Longstreet’s 30,000 until Meade sent reinforcements, and by occupying both Round Tops made our left secure.

"I claim that General Sickles, in promptly seizing the Emettsburg ridge, instead of allowing the enemy to gain that vantage ground, showed the highest soldierly qualities."—St. Paul and Minneapolis *Pioneer Press*, Sunday, 29th August, 1886.

(NOTE to "Smitten by idiocy," line 31, page 16.) A great many commanders-in-chief exercise as little influence, or not much more, upon the successes attributed to their ability and force than the old Exemplar-Muscovite, who was hailed as the conqueror, in 1812, of the Corsican-French-Attila. The fact is, "History, that vast Mississippi of lies," on its freshets or floods floats high the lighter wood, while the heavier and more valuable is always either concealed in the turbid flow or partially if not altogether submerged.

[FATALITY.—"So far as their own free will was concerned, Napoleon and Alexander contributed no more by their actions to the accomplishment of such or such an event than the private soldier who was compelled to fight for them as a recruit or a conscript. Indeed, how could it be otherwise? For the fulfilment of their will, which apparently ruled the course of the world, the concurrence was needed of an infinite number of factors, all the thousands of individuals who were the active instruments of their purpose—all these soldiers, ready to fight or to transport cannon and victuals—had severally to consent to obey the orders of two feeble human units, and their obedience was the result of endlessly varied and complicated motives.

"FATALISM is the only clew to HISTORY when we endeavor to understand its illogical phenomena; or, shall we say, those phenomena of which we see the causation but darkly, and which only seem the more illogical the more earnestly we strive to account for them. * * *

"The life of man is twofold—one side of it is his own personal experience, which is free and independent in proportion as his interests are lofty and transcendental; the other is his social life, as an atom in the human swarm which binds him down with its laws and forces him to submit to them. For although a man has a conscious individual existence, do what he will he is but the unconscious tool of history and humanity. The higher he stands on the social ladder, the more numerous the fellow beings whom he can influence, the more absolute his power, the more clearly do we perceive the predestined and irresistible necessity of his every action.

"The heart of kings is in the hands of God. Kings [all Rulers and Leaders in fact] are the slaves of history.

"History—that is to say, the collective life of the aggregate of human beings—turns each moment of a monarch's life to account,

and binds kings to its own ends." "War and Peace," second series. Harper's Franklin Square Library, No. 521, page 46 (1.)

(NOTE * * line 18, page 18.) [The influence of the majority of generals, so lauded, upon the victories attributed to their judgment and gallantry, about answers to the picture descriptive of the Russian commander-in-chief, the idol of the people, at Borodino:

"Koutouzow, with his head bent and sunk all into a heap, from his own weight, sat all day where Pierre had seen him in the morning, on a bench covered with a rug; he gave no orders, but merely approved or disapproved of what was suggested to him.

"That is it—yes, yes, do so," he would say; or, 'Go and see, my good friend, go and see!' or, again: 'That is of no use; we must wait.'—Tolstoi's "War and Peace," Series III., I., 84.]

[Note to line 10, page 19, "FORDING OF THE SUSQUEHANNA." —"As to the coal-mountain expedition [*i. e.*, irruption into the mining districts of Pennsylvania] and the paralytic effect it might have produced, it seems to me you are right. As to the fact that people confound a *basis* with a *base line*, you are right. As to there being as good a basis for provisions *before* as *behind* Lee, you are right. As to a basis for a supply of ammunition, I don't know. As to crossing the Susquehanna, I once *walked* along the Susquehanna from Wilkesbarre to Havre-de-Grace. *There is not, I fancy, in the world another river of such great breadth which is so shallow. Fordable with short intervals, one might say, everywhere until within five miles of Havre-de-Grace (Port Deposit), I should say there would have been little more difficulty in crossing BELOW Columbia than ABOVE it, and what with our being able to send gunboats into the Delaware, possibly the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal might have been used for small ones; and with the sort of angle into which he would have entered, it seems to me, Lee would have run a tremendous risk in going to Philadelphia without first beating Meade's army.*

"For us, as you mention, there was always that tremendous clog on the neck, of defending Washington. If the original plan of having there a *permanent* garrison of 40,000 men had been followed out, and the place had been made a grand camp of instruction, it would not have been so. But, to my mind, everything that depended on the War Department was managed as only civilians, and politicians at that, would have managed it; *i. e.*, worse than it could have been managed by any *honest* errors. It was one great trouble with the August, 1862, campaign that Washington must be defended by the army in the field.

"But, after all, as you say, the Southern troops were (in *esse*) the best, excepting, of course, the artillery. In *posse*, I think, ours

were the best, if we could have got as good officers; as good, that is by the definition as to getting work out of the men. Their [the Rebel] officers were the best, and as marksmen, I think, their men were our superiors *in general*. Richmond was no clog to them, for they could depend on the citizens to garrison it. Their War Department had a bad man, I fear, but a soldier (Davis [meaning in his exercise of absolute power over every department]) at its head. They had no Halleck, timid and rash and an ignoramus, to balk their generals and select to gratify his animosities. Mangold [the Prussian critic on the American Civil War] says Lee was "naturally disposed to take risks," and Lee must have, at least, fancied [or conceived there would be] difficulties in this case [his sortie of 1863]. Possibly the loss of Jackson made the difference. Little doubt Jackson would have marched on Philadelphia.

"Under military bridges have you ever considered those McDowell says he and Haupt threw across Potomac Creek and—— in nine days four stories of trestle and crib-work, and for long carrying railway trains?" General W—— P—— W—— to General de P. July, 1866.]

HOOD'S REPORT ON GETTYSBURG.*

"Accordingly my troops moved out of camp, crossed the Rapidan about the 5th June, 1863, and joined in the general move in the direction of the Potomac. We crossed the river about the middle of the same month, and marched into Pennsylvania. Hill's and Ewell's Corps were in advance, and were reported to be in the vicinity of Carlisle. Whilst lying in camp, not far distant from Chambersburg, information was received that Ewell and Hill were about to come in contact with the enemy near Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaw's Division, were put in motion upon the most direct road to that point, which, after a hard march, we reached before or at sunrise on the 2d of July. So imperative had been the orders to hasten forward with all possible speed that, on the march, my troops were allowed to halt and rest only about two hours, during the night from the 1st to the 2d of July.

"I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, where the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of that same morning, we were both engaged, in company with Generals Lee and A. P. Hill, in

* This is a note to line 31, page 16.

observing the position of the Federals. General Lee—with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre-belt buckled around the waist, and field-glasses pending at his side—walked up and down in the shade of the large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet, at times, buried in deep thought. Colonel Freemantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off, with glass in constant use, examining the lofty position of the Federal army.

“General Lee was, seemingly, anxious you should attack that morning,” he remarked to me. “The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him, he will whip us. You [Longstreet] thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett’s Division—at that time still in the rear—in order to make the attack; and you said to me, subsequently, whilst we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: ‘The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.’” See Maj.-Gen. S. W. Crawford’s Testimony, Gen. de Peyster’s “Soldiers’ Monument Inaugural Address.” Pages 94–103.

“Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day, when in the afternoon—about three o’clock—it was decided to no longer await Pickett’s Division, but to proceed to our extreme right and attack up the Emmetsburg road. McLaws moved off, and I followed with my division. In a short time I was ordered to quicken the march of my troops, and to pass to the front of McLaws.

“This movement was accomplished by throwing out an advanced force to tear down fences and clear the way. The instructions I received were to place my division across the Emmetsburg road, form line of battle, and attack. Before reaching this road, however, I had sent forward some of my picked Texan scouts, to ascertain the position of the enemy’s extreme left flank. *They soon reported to me that it rested upon Round Top Mountain; that the country was open, and that I could march through an open woodland pasture around Round Top, and assault the enemy in flank and rear; that their wagon trains were packed in rear of their line, and were badly exposed to our attack in that direction.* As soon as I arrived upon the Emmetsburg road, I placed one or two batteries in position and opened fire. A reply from the enemy’s guns soon developed his lines. His left rested on or near Round Top, with line bending back and again forward, forming, as it were, a concave line, as approached by the Emmetsburg road. A considerable body of troops was posted in front of their main line, between the Emmetsburg road and Round Top Mountain. *This force [Third Corps] was in line of battle upon an eminence near a peach orchard.*

"I found that, in making the attack according to orders, viz.: up the Emmetsburg road, I should have first to encounter and drive off this advanced line of battle; secondly, at the base and along the slope of the mountain, to confront immense boulders of stone, so massed together as to form narrow openings, which would break our ranks and cause the men to scatter whilst climbing up the rocky precipice. I found, moreover, that my division would be exposed to a heavy fire from the main line of the enemy [to which the Third Corps was advanced in echelon] in position on the crest of the high range, of which Round Top was the extreme left, and, by reason of the concavity of the enemy's main line, that we would be subject to a destructive fire in flank and rear, as well as in front; and deemed it almost an impossibility to clamber along the boulders up this steep and rugged mountain, and, under this number of cross-fires, put the enemy to flight. I knew that, if the feat was accomplished, it must be at a most fearful sacrifice of as brave and gallant soldiers as ever engaged in battle.

"The reconnoissance of my Texas scouts, and the development of the Federal lines, were effected in a very short space of time; in truth, shorter than I have taken time to recall and jot down these facts, although the scenes and events of that day are as clear to my mind as if the great battle had been fought yesterday. I was in possession of these important facts so shortly after reaching the Emmetsburg road, that I considered it my duty to report to you [Longstreet], at once, my opinion that it was unwise to attack up the Emmetsburg road, as ordered, and to urge that you allow me to TURN Round Top, and *attack the enemy in flank and rear*. Accordingly, I despatched a staff-officer, bearing to you my request to be allowed to make the proposed movement on account of the above stated reasons. Your reply was quickly received, 'General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmetsburg road.' I sent another officer to say that I feared nothing could be accomplished by such an attack, and renewed my request to TURN Round Top. Again your answer was, 'General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmetsburg road.' During this interim, I had continued the use of the batteries upon the enemy, and had become more and more convinced that the Federal line extended to Round Top, and that I could not reasonably hope to accomplish much by the attack as ordered, *In fact, it seemed to me the enemy occupied a position by nature so strong—I may say impregnable—that, independently of their flank fire, they could easily repel our attack by merely throwing and rolling stones down the mountain side as we approached.*

"A third time I despatched one of my staff to explain fully in regard to the situation, and suggest that you had better come and

look for yourself. I selected, in this instance, my adjutant-general, Colonel Harry Sellers, whom you know to be, not only an officer of great courage, but also of marked ability. Colonel Sellers returned with the same message, 'General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmetsburg road.' Almost simultaneously, Colonel Fairfax, of your staff, rode up and repeated the above orders.

"After this urgent protest of entering the battle of Gettysburg according to instructions—which protest is the first and only one I ever made during my entire military career—I ordered my line to advance and make the assault. [J. W. de P. worked out the same idea correctly in his "Gettysburg." See Gen. TREMAIN'S Testimony, 154, No. III, of "The Decisive Conflicts of the late Civil War or Slaveholders' Rebellion," pages 63, &c., 154, &c. The work is worthy of examination, as written between summer of 1863 and spring of 1867, in the light of more recent and constantly developing revelations.]

"As my troops were moving forward, you [Longstreet] rode up in person; a brief conversation passed between us, during which I again expressed the fears above mentioned, and regret at not being allowed to attack in flank around Round Top. You answered to this effect, 'We must obey the orders of General Lee.' I then rode forward with my line under a heavy fire. In about twenty minutes, after reaching the Peach Orchard, I was severely wounded in the arm, and borne from the field.

"With this wound terminated my participation in this great battle. As I was borne off on a litter to the rear, I could but experience deep distress of mind and heart at the thought of the inevitable fate of my brave fellow-soldiers who formed one of the grandest divisions of that world-renowned army; and I shall ever believe that, had I been permitted to turn Round Top Mountain, we would not only have gained that position, but have been able finally to rout the enemy.

"I am, respectfully, yours,

J. B. HOOD."

Notwithstanding the seemingly impregnable character of the enemy's position upon Round Top Mountain, Benning's Brigade, in concert with the First Texas Regiment, succeeded in gaining temporary possession of the Federal line; they captured three guns, and sent them to the rear. Unfortunately, the other commands, whose advance up a steep ascent was impeded by immense boulders and sharp ledges of rock, were unable to keep pace up the mountain side in their front, and render the necessary support. Never did a grander, more heroic division enter into battle; nor did ever troops fight more desperately to overcome the insurmountable difficulties against which they had to contend, as Law,

Benning, Anderson and Robertson nobly led their brave men to this unsuccessful assault. General Law [? McLaws], after I was wounded, assumed command of the division, and proved himself, by his courage and ability, fully equal to the responsibilities of the position.

The losses were very heavy, as shown by the reports, and have often caused me the *more bitterly to regret that I was not permitted to turn Round Top Mountain.*—"Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate States Armies." By J. B. Hood, Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army. 1880." Pages 56-60.

(From *The Soldier's Friend*, March 27, 1869.)

AFTER GETTYSBURG AND AT WILLIAMSPORT.

"We have scotched the snake, not killed it."
 "Letting 'I dare not' wait upon 'I would.'"—MACBETH.

With the cheers which rang along the Union line like a *feu-de-joie* or rolling fire of musketry, saluting the appearance, at the point of collision, of the commander of the victorious Army of the Potomac, the war-churn of the decisive battle, as our people have elected to style it, at the East, ceased. The three days' contest was over; the sickle had strewn the field with the harvest, but that harvest was gleaned, not garnered. That evening, the roar of the wheeled-flood-tide which had hitherto flowed from east to west subsided into the slack-water of the repulse. When it broke again upon the strained ear of expectancy, it was ebbing, with the waning moon, from east to west, thither, whence for so many anxious days previous it had poured. Already, under the impulse of the fiery Pleasanton, our cavalry, let loose, were picking up scattered sheafs where our army should have piled the groaning wains with shocks of trophies. On the 6th, back toward the Potomac commenced the retreat of the Army of Northern Virginia, "streaming," a confused mass, which a close pursuit would have soon converted into a rout. Horse, slashed and gashed; infantry, decimated—fought out, wrought out, and despondent; artillery with almost empty ammunition-boxes and exhausted teams; wagons laden with the spoils of Pennsylvania; and prisoners so buoyed up with the assurance of rescue, that, even although starving, they refused the parole offered—nay, pressed upon them. "Streaming" was the expression of the toll-gate keepers and of the spoiled inhabitants, who beheld that flood amid the darkness and the rain, and under the blazing sun of mid-summer, toil onward through the mountain passes by which they had advanced, elate with faith in the star of Lee, and the con-

fidence of speedy victory over the only host which stood between their tattered battalions and their triumphant revel in the fertile country districts and the wealthy marts and cities of the North. Blackened with powder and with gore; travel-stained, begrimed with the soil on which they confidently hoped to camp on as conquerors; bemired and besmirched with the stains of marches, battle and travail of soul—this horde, which issued forth to subvert freedom, pursued its wearied way amid the shrieks of agony from multitudes of dead and dying, which filled the air with sounds of horror and the fields with hasty graves scooped to receive the dead cast forth from the impressed cavalcade of vehicles, swept together from the surrounding country to receive the mutilated forms of heroes; for, if ever heroism was displayed, it was shown by the South as well as by the North at Gettysburg: on the part of the South, “the poor man’s fight in the rich man’s war;” on the part of the North, the “soldiers’ battle,” even as was said of Inkerman by the most prominent general on the field, Sir Charles Wyndham, afterward the Hero of the Redan—Inkerman, the greatest of the Crimean fights, fought to defend a stretch of heights, ending, like Gettysburg, in the slaughterous repulse and defeat of hosts fierce in their championship of ideas dominant in the past.

With Gregg slashing in and slicing off fragments on the flank, and Kilpatrick thundering with his artillery, carving with his cavalry, burning miles of wagons in their midst—for in the part he played on this occasion, Kilpatrick seemed to make a very sport of his brave and perilous work, very much as Mokanna amused himself in his forced flight—with this difference, that the “Veiled Prophet” was cutting down his own men, who would not stand up for him any longer, and Kilpatrick was cutting off the enemy who could not stand up any longer as an array against the followers of the true faith, Liberal Institutions—the rebels continued on toward the Potomac by the direct road, the chord of the arc along whose curve the Army of the Potomac escorted them, so to speak, after a partial and faint demonstration toward the Monterey pass against the rear guard, almost devoid of ammunition for its guns: so short of supplies, that Scheibert, a Prussian officer present with the rebel army, admits—corroborating the testimony of our General Howe, himself an artillery officer—that dearth of ordnance supplies rendered a retrograde compulsory upon Lee. “Nothing but the excessive need of ammunition determined the retreat. General R. E. Lee had not over one hundred charges per gun left, and could not therefore offer another battle which might last over a day. He saw himself compelled to return to his base of operations, and this—his base—was

the—Rappahannock.”—“Seven Months in the Rebel States during the North American War.” 1868. By Scheibert. Stettin, (Prussia), 1868. [The only copy, the author believes, in this country.]

Howe swore that a captured rebel artillery officer told him there were not two rounds per gun left for the rear guard. Yet, notwithstanding, the Union army were not permitted to press the rebel rout.

Around Hagerstown a series of combats ensued, most glorious to our cavalry, striving to arrest the retreating rebels and interpose a barrier between them and the Potomac, and cut off the vast wagon-train, laden with confiscations and contributions which Imboden was conducting farther west, and more directly southward, through Greencastle, upon the ford or crossing at Williamsport.

At first our cavalry had the best of it, and would have succeeded in effecting their object had not the rebels received a *stiffening* of infantry, which gave them sufficient backbone to enable them to restore their communications with the river. Here Providence befriended *us* again and arrested *their* crossing by such heavy down-pours of rain that the Potomac, ordinarily fordable at the usual low stage of water in the summer, flowed “*swimming*,” as Pleasanton quaintly expressed it. It was utterly impassable. The column detached by French, for the purpose, had destroyed the rebel bridges at Falling Waters. Meanwhile, Kelly, from West Virginia, having under him the indefatigable and resolute Averill, was sweeping down to intercept their line of retreat and cut off stragglers, and another column was advancing up the Peninsula upon Richmond, if for no other purpose, with the intent of detaining reinforcements from being sent northward. The troops with whom Averill was present did not make time, or rather get up in time, while the expedition toward Richmond terminated, as a participant expressed it, in a “blackberry raid,” alluding to the profuse enjoyment of that luscious wild fruit with which the soldiers refreshed themselves upon their hot and sultry march.

Nevertheless, the rebels were in a trap, notwithstanding their cavalry, *starved* with the first arrivals of their infantry, had frayed the way for the main body. The rebel exodus was arrested by waters, if not as wide to them, still for a time as impassable as the Red Sea, and though the pursuers, like the hosts of Pharoah, drave heavily and came lumbering after, no miraculous way was open to their Moses *through* the waves. To pass *over* it, bridge material was needed; it had to be sought with time, labor and difficulties. As thus the defeated army drew toward the Poto-

mac, their depleted numbers—the depth of whose depletion has never yet been vouchsafed by those who knew, and can only be arrived at by circumstantial evidence by those who had not the immediate means of knowing—drew toward the Potomac and gradually assumed that curved chain of positions, July 11th–12th, from nine to eleven miles, certainly ten, in extent, between its left wing established in the fields, ‘in the air,’ just west of the borough of Hagerstown, astraddle of the National Road or Turnpike, and its right on some lofty hills, and in some wooded, broken ground, subsiding to the Potomac below Falling Waters. As the Prussian eye-witness is a disinterested one at the best, and may certainly be set down as one partial to the rebels from his tone, his testimony at this point is very valuable. “On the 11th our position was entrenched,” says he, “because the enemy was drawing nearer and nearer along a front from six to eight English miles, which appeared to me a much too attenuated line for our 70,000 men, since it assigned only four men to every pace.” If this line of six to eight miles was too thinly manned, how much more so was it in reality if Lee had only 45,000 to 60,000 men to distribute along ten to eleven miles of front, of whom a large number must have been occupied in sweeping up provisions, food having almost failed, and in collecting materials for the bridges which constituted the only ultimate hope of salvation.

Let us again resort to Scheibert's work for a concise expression of current events:

“Near Hagerstown, General Lee rested and waited to see what Meade would do—Meade did nothing.”

Again alluding to Lee's thin lines, he intimates, quoting: “Colonel Long, of the rebel staff, said smiling, that: ‘Since Fredericksburg, the Yankees had a most prodigious respect for such lines of rifle-pits.’”

It has often been stated that a certain hill, about at the centre of the rebel line and opposite St. James' College, was the key to their position; that thence their lines could be enfiladed northward to their left and westward to their right. Its occupation in force by them was a strong if not the strongest motive for withholding an attack, because it was averred that it rendered that portion of Lee's position unattackable. Concede this, and the failure to attack becomes incomprehensible, because General Pleasanton declares that, “On the day of the council (July 12th), the brigade of cavalry that was in front of General Slocum's command, under Colonel (Huey, *not*) Henry (a young Quaker from Philadelphia), of the (8th) Pennsylvania Cavalry, near St. James' College, drove in the enemy and reported to me (Pleasanton), that he could have *held*, *not carried*, as his language was erroneously taken down,

that position, but that General Slocum had ordered him to halt for fear of bringing on a general engagement." When he was withdrawn, the rebels occupied that point in force and garnished it very heavily with artillery. "The enemy afterward brought a strong force," continued Pleasonton, "there, to hold that point." Demoralized in everything but courage, the rebels may have been said to have "bluffed" us off, until they had improvised bridges, and then, in the midst of pouring rain and bitter cold and unseasonable weather, the withdrawal took place. The outposts were first called in on the night of 13th-14th. This night was pitch dark; a man could not see his hand before his very eyes. Horses stuck fast—men mired. Ice-cold rain fell, and beyond the river the wheels sunk down to the hubs and [roads] were "so crammed," to use Scheibert's words, "that no one could get along." Brevet Colonel W. H. Paine corroborates this, particularly the cold. "The ground," he says, "on the dark, dismal morning of the 14th, had the appearance in places of being frozen from the hail or sleet of the previous night." But it is needless to dwell upon what seemed a calamity, which honest common-sense Lincoln looked upon as such, and expressed himself in a homely way, which, however pregnant with truth, to repeat, might shock the pious-minded. Afterward he spoke to the same effect, but in more orthodox language. In either case, he was right. The nation felt as he did, and the military critic can only unite with the poet in wishing for "one hour of Dundee" at that crisis; or with Campbell for the "Bruce of Bannockburn." But it needs not the flight of poetry to find fitting words. In opposition to the remark sworn to by Warren, in answer to the question, "What, in your opinion, as a military man, would have been the effect of a general assault upon the enemy's position there by the river?" "I think we should have cut them all to pieces; that's my opinion." It is set down that Meade observed that "if the enemy fell back across the river (the Potomac), he could follow them into their own country and give them battle, under probably as favorable circumstances as were there presented to him—that is, he thought, if he lost that opportunity, he could have another one."

How differently "Marshal Forwards," the "old Blucher," would have answered, even as he spoke out the honest convictions of a soldier after his Gettysburg victory, on the Katzbach: "You must pay no attention to the complaints of cavalry" (or even of starved and exhausted infantry), "for when so great a result as the obliteration of a whole army of the enemy can be attained, the State can well sacrifice a few hundred horses which fall dead from fatigue. The neglect to utilize a victory to the uttermost involves, as an inevitable consequence, the fighting of a new battle, in which

everything done (or won) may be undone (or lost).”—[Blucher to York, 31st August, 1813.—Scherr., III., 159.

“The General-in-Chief,” is the comment of the distinguished Müffling, “had shown that he well knew how to seize the proper moment for passing from a prudent defence to a bold attack, which must produce great results.” After the battle, he had done everything to instigate them all to exert their utmost strength in the pursuit; and his words—“with some bodily exertion now, you may spare a new battle”—had turned out true.—“Passages from My Life and Writings.” By Baron von Müffling. London, 1853, page 327.

The most inexplicable phase of the escape of Lee across the Potomac, on the morning of June 14th, 1863, is the total ignorance within the Union lines that any such retrograde movement was in progress. As before mentioned, it was a night of inky darkness and ice-cold, beating rain. Following the sinuosities of the rough and miry roads, some of the rebel troops and artillery had to move from ten to twelve miles from their left wing, west of Hagerstown to the bridge at Falling Waters. [The distances in this article have been submitted to Colonel W. H. Paine, U. S. Volunteers, Topographical Staff, and have met with his entire approval.] In such obscurity, and amid such difficulties, it must have taken the enemy's troops the whole night to overcome that distance. The rebel outposts were first withdrawn in the night. The sun rose at ten minutes before 5 A. M. The rebel bridge was not taken up until 1 P. M. No move appears to have been contemplated before 7 A. M. Our cavalry attacked between 8 and 10.30 A. M. What was our army doing between sunrise and noon?—seven hours. Where were our spies, scouts and pickets? Ought we not to have made a sharp reconnoissance early that morning? How was it that we saw nothing and heard nothing? Although there is a great deal of wood in that district, there are very extensive clearings which are commanded by heights, which present extensive views; moreover, the country, although rolling, subsides toward the river. In active campaigning, in the presence of an enemy, with the expectation of a collision, a well-organized army ought to keep a bright lookout, and, where it cannot see, *feel* for the enemy. The inactivity of those few hours, on that eventful morning, present more of the incomprehensible than any other period of the war. Paine records in his “Journal,” 14th July, Tuesday: “Mortified by the report that the rebels have crossed the Potomac in the night and left. All the corps were to advance at 8 A. M.” Afterwards he added: “Was chagrined that the rebels had all crossed the Potomac. [Our troops are all advancing very rapidly now the enemy has gone!]”

It has been argued that, even if our generals had been aware that Lee was withdrawing, the broken country, within the arc of the rebel line, presented admirable positions for troops accustomed to "bushwhacking" to arrest the pursuit of masses dislocated by the accidents of the ground. This would be true if the retreating forces had been as well supplied and fed as their opponents, or if the country had offered commanding ridges, on which to make a stand, such as afforded some excuse after Gettysburg.

In the first place, Frederic, at Torgau, in 1760, and Napoleon in his "Forest Fights," in 1809, obtained the most brilliant advantages over superior forces, in selected positions, under exactly identical circumstances. But this is not all; the ground did not favor the rebels. The country fell away in successive waves, and gradually contracted toward the two points of crossing at Williamsport and Falling Waters, within the segment formed by the curve of Lee's earthworks, and his line of retreat from his left to Williamsport, and from his right to Falling Waters. The rebel columns must have drawn together, and men, horses, artillery, and trains have become huddled as they crowded down to the ford and to the bridge. Then and there, at the crisis, they must have been exposed to a concentric fire from the last range of heights, like that poured upon the French right at Waterloo, which high ground dominated every avenue of escape. (See anecdote of Lincoln and Meade, pages 52 and 53.)

Here again the suggestion of such a plunging fire has been met by a counter-argument that the heights on the Virginia shore, beyond the Potomac, command the ridge on this, the eastern, the Maryland bank. Grant this; but how long would it have taken a superior artillery, amply supplied with ammunition, to silence, drive off, or destroy an inferior artillery, very short of ammunition, especially when the rebel generals themselves admitted that a contest between the two artilleries "was a farce," always ending to the disadvantage of the rebels, as was invariably demonstrated during the Maryland campaign of September, 1862, but never so pointedly as in the trial between our batteries around the Cemetery and the rebel guns on Benner's Ridge, on the second day of Gettysburg. It did not take twenty minutes for the former, after they got the range, to dispose of the latter, and cover their position with wrecks and mutilations. A few years hence, when this escape of Lee's is criticised by military writers, it will rank with that of the Prince de Vaudemont, in 1795, from before Marshal Villeroy, in which the great William declared the Prince had "shown himself a greater master of his art than if he had won a pitched battle"—a retreat of which the success ranks among some of the inexplicable marvels recorded here and there in the annals of military operations. ANCHOR.

CONCLUSION.

At one time it was intended to greatly augment this pamphlet with interesting notes and trustworthy authorities, but as new works appear and are welcomed by public opinion as guiding lights when they are mere will-o'-the-whisks, it seems useless to endeavor to present the truth. Most of our histories are mere efforts of memory, or offsprings of prejudice or partiality, or bids for public favor, or panegyrics worthy of the venal writers of the Lower Empire. History is unworthy of acceptance which cannot appeal to the law and the testimony. In regard to the trustworthiness of long deferred *post facto* statements, a writer on historical subjects is justified in feeling the strongest doubt of any such assertion not based on memoranda made at the moment. Strong men's *memories* have often been found to be utterly at variance with their *diaries*; so much so that one who has had occasion to compare the two has become pretty well convinced that not more than in one case out of one thousand is human memory—unassisted by notes made at the time and upon the spot—trustworthy after the lapse of a few years. It is this fact, not absolute black-hearted falsehood, that makes men so reckless in their assertiveness, and in the Sickles controversy, which has aroused so many advocates, champions and antagonisms, men state what they *wish* to believe, not because they desire or intend to tell untruths or pervert, but because the human memory is such a curious thing that often, through much thinking on a subject, wishes become realities to the imagination, and what would originally have been rejected as *false* eventually assumes the form and force of *truth*. So it is with everything connected with or dependent upon the frailties of our being. As the Romans said, "Times change, and we change with them."

As a further evidence of the difficulty of arriving at the bed-rock facts, take the following anecdote, which has been related again and again, in regard to the telegram which Lincoln is said to have sent privately to MEADE when he came up with Lee after Gettysburg, at *Williamsport*, 12th July, 1863. It is derived, for one, from the lips of a distinguished Major-General, remarkably careful in his statements and not prejudiced against Meade. He afterwards asked me to recall and record my recollections of what long since occurred, to assist in ferreting out the truth. It is stated that not only was this telegram known to have existed, but that it had been actually shown, when written, to a gentleman of high position and the largest opportunities, still living. The story is this. Lincoln telegraphed to Meade, 12th July, 1863, to attack Lee "*peremptorily*," cost what it might, and if he failed to produce the telegram as his

excuse and justification; but, if he succeeded, to destroy the telegram and take all the glory of the victory to himself—and that Meade had not the stuff in him to do so.

Injustice, the suppression or distortion of facts, the disappearance or destruction of documents, accidental or wilful, have succeeded in elevating Grant and Lee, Sherman, Meade, Sheridan, Hancock, Schofield, and others, at the expense of George H. Thomas, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, and others, as well as some on lower planes who, sick and sad at injustice and ingratitude, sleep in comparatively unknown and unnoted graves.

As Frank Wilkeson observes in his "Recollections," "The history of the fighting to suppress the Slaveholders' Rebellion, thus far written [January, 1887], has been the work of commanding generals." "Most of this war history has been written to repair damaged or wholly ruined military reputations." "And it is susceptible of demonstration that the almost ruinous delay in suppressing the Rebellion and restoring the Union, the deadly campaigns year after year, the awful waste of the best soldiers the world has seen, and the piling up of the public debt into the billions, was wholly due to West Point influence and West Point commanders." There is a very large percentage of truth in the last sentence, applicable South as well as North; but, without due consideration, it, nevertheless, conveys a very false impression. West Point is a close corporation, like a college of priests regarding all outside merit as heretical and damnable; but there are exceptions to the rule, such as George H. Thomas, Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, Abner Doubleday, &c., with McClellan and his *Gefolge*, and lots of others, too numerous to mention. Wilkeson was justified in a bitterness founded on what he saw and suffered; but a West Point, or rather West Points, are necessary to a country to prepare officers for the routine of military life, and with all its evils and even with all its de-relictions—for through esoteric influence the cruellest wrongs have been committed—an academy, or academies, must be maintained for thorough education in the military art and science. How to provide against its hierarchical secret brotherhood, its "union is strength," is a problem yet to be solved and very difficult of solution. The legislator who can devise the ways and means to eliminate the evil or neutralize its poison, and yet retain all the good, will, indeed, be a public benefactor. There is one officer perfectly competent to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, a fearless writer when aroused, a close observer, a clear, concise and classical author when he pleases, who might rectify many errors in history were he not "cribbed, cabined and confined," shut up, enveloped, impregnated with a hierophantic reverence for that awful humbug of sanctity, West Point. Mat-

thew Arnold, quoting Homer, observes, "Wide is the range of words! words may make this way or that way." Indeed, they may, and they have been misapplied, as for one instance already alluded to, to elevate Meade and to defame Sickles at Gettysburg. Again, to restrict high command to West Point is a great injustice to genius and talent at large; for Goethe was perfectly justified in "feeling so strongly how much the discipline of a great public life and of practical affairs has to do with intelligence." "What else is CULTURE," he asks, "but a higher conception of political and military relations?" How a party, or faction, or hierarchy, applying the term to administrative and military as well as priestly organization, can get the control so as to act almost independently of the wishes of the nation and its head, is shown by the attested fact that Christina, Queen of Sweden, to bring about the Peace of Westphalia, had to conspire against her ministry and military chiefs and actually to gather together a party of her own, a secret administration within a recognized administration, and to send a representative of her own to the Congress at Osnabruck to checkmate and traverse the plans of a colleague selected and accredited by the ministry and the ruling party of the country. The ability of Adler Salvius accomplished all that the Queen desired; whether wisely or unwisely is not here in question. The anecdote is told simply to show that a class or caste like that which West Point produces can even dispute the will of autocracy and of the people, until overthrown or neutralized by greater astuteness coupled with unusual ability.

The preceding considerations will serve as an introduction to some common sense views of

THE UNION OF PRACTICE AND THEORY IN MILITARY MATTERS.

What now follows are the remarks of a bridge builder who did not have the slightest idea of their suitable application to the Carrying on of War. Nevertheless their pertinence invites attention. The combination of THEORY and PRACTICE must be superior to either by itself. The professional soldier is the mechanic; he may handle his tools admirably without being able to construct anything beyond the scope of his daily labor. The architect who plans the structure is the theorist who, in a great measure, learns his science from books. He may never have handled a tool, nor have entered a workshop, and, notwithstanding, be a proficient. The same holds good with regard to marine and military matters. Some of the most wonderful steps in advance in both, did not originate with professional men, but with theorists, or thinkers, observers as well as students. A highly gifted man like Lucullus or Spinola or Phipps may take the command of an army and make a

far more truly great captain than myriads of men who have risen from the ranks to be generals by routine or through a West Point. They might not be able to *make* an army, but they might be competent to handle an army far better than those who made it. Poets are born and so are generals: likewise all men exceedingly great in their line; but as long as professionals, like the graduates of a West Point, continue to be considered by the people the only class from which great generals can be drawn, so long will no man, even as gifted as either of the few of the first class of great captains, have a chance to exhibit his innate powers. West Point and Regulars are, in so far, no better than the Knights of Labor, that they will allow no man to enter into competition with them or maintain himself if they can prevent it.

"But, if a union of talents were once accomplished, the mechanic, in the course of his practical experiments, would be assisted by the sound calculations of the mathematician, and his work would be sooner perfected. Also, the mathematician would undoubtedly find no small degree of profit from the practical demonstrations which the ingenious mechanic alone is able to produce." [In a few words, successful result is the child of practice and theory.]

"OLINTHUS GREGORY, in the preface to his excellent work *Statics*, illustrates this subject in a manner which ought not to be here omitted. There are few artists but will admire his wit and agree with his sound remarks.

He begins thus: "For some years I have seen, or have seen, and often regretted, that a forbidding and awkward jealousy seem to subsist between the *theoretical* men engaged in the cultivation of mechanics in this country [England], and it is a desire to shorten this time to eradicate this jealousy, that has been a principal part of the execution of the following work.

"I have by long habit, combined, perhaps, with my prejudices, been much delighted with the investigations of the practical person, and rest as firmly upon them; yet I do not forget that, as all general principles imply theoretical deductions, it would be highly injudicious not to apply these to practical applications as approximations. Theoretical deductions must be supplied, as, indeed, they are, by practical deductions from experience.

"Habits of abstraction and theoretical deductions without the aid of inductive of essential good.

"But as an eminent philosopher

‘Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind,’ pages 221, &c.], for whose talents and virtues I entertain great respect, remarks, Care should be take to guard against both these extremes, and to unite habits of abstraction with habits of business, in such a manner as to enable men to consider things either in general or in detail, as the occasion may require. Whichever of these habits may happen to gain an undue ascendant over the mind, it will necessarily produce a character limited in its powers, and fitted only for particular exertion. When theoretical knowledge and practical skill are happily combined in the same person, the intellectual power of man appears in its full perfection, and fits him equally to conduct with a masterly hand the details of ordinary business, and to contend successfully with the untried difficulties of new and hazardous situations. In conducting the former, mere experience may frequently be a sufficient guide, but experience and speculation must be combined together to prepare us for the latter.’ ‘Expert men,’ says Lord Bacon, ‘can execute and judge particulars, one by one; but the general counsels, the plots, and the marshalling of affairs, comes best from those that are unlearned. Admitting the truth of these observations, it will thence follow, that theoretical and practical men will most effectually promote their mutual interests, not by affecting to despise each other, but by blending their efforts; and further, that an essential part of science will be done to mechanical science, by endeavoring to unite the scattered rays of light they have separately thrown upon the region of human knowledge, converge to one point.’ The above elegant and impartial hints, afforded us by the learned and kind friend to science, Olinthus Gregory, merit the author’s warmest commendation and ardent wishes, that they may be received by the philosophers and mechanics of the United States, with all that attention and regard, a conviction of their truth must ever inspire. “The Architect and Landscape Gardener.” New York, 1793. Pages XXIII.—XXVI.

THE FLYING PENDANT LEVER BRIDGE OVER LAKE CAYUGA.

The Flying Pendant Lever Bridge over the Cayuga lake, in New York, is a fine specimen of the road from Albany to Niagara, stands on a rocky ledge, each consisting of three posts connected by four braces. The posts are sunk to hard ground about thirty feet from the surface of the water, and are twenty-five feet apart. *The whole length of the bridge is 1,200 feet, and it cost twenty thousand dollars.*—See the Treatise on Bridge Architecture, in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, of the Flying Pendant Lever Bridge, designed by the late Mr. Pope, Architect and Landscape Gardener. Pages 128–29.

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